The Revival of Europe (Report II): Strategic Feasibility of a European Federal State in the Twenty-First Century

 



THE REVIVAL OF EUROPE


Strategic Feasibility of a European Federal State

in the Twenty-First Century

 


 

Juliet Zhong

Independent Researcher

London, United Kingdom | November 2026

 

 

This is the second of two companion reports. The first, The Revival of Europe: Ideological Crisis and the Case for a European Federal State, was posted in October 2026. The present report was conceived and directed by Juliet Zhong on the basis of her 2025 dialogue record and outline, drafted with the assistance of Claude (Anthropic), and rewritten in November 2026. Factual statements about the period 2024 to 2026 rest on the official documents and data listed in the References. 


 

Abstract

This report is the second of two companion studies on the European Federal State (EFS). Report I argued that Europe's crisis is ideological, a mismatch between the national scale at which sovereignty is believed to reside and the continental scale at which it must now be exercised, and that only a federal state limited to five domains can close it. Report II asks whether that state can be built, and how. It sets out the constitutional design: a federation of enumerated competence under a bounded Supremacy Clause, a Federal Chamber and a States Chamber, a parliamentary executive, a Federal Constitutional Court and a justiciable subsidiarity guarantee. It sets out the security order: a Unified Federal Command Structure inside NATO, a single foreign policy decided by majority, a Federal Security Council with a limited emergency power, a federal frontier and asylum system, a federal intelligence agency and a three-stage path for the French deterrent. It sets out the fiscal order: a federal budget of 4.5 percent of GDP, federal bonds, the assumption of legacy debt up to 60 percent of GDP with interest service retained by the states, an automatic stabiliser tested on twenty-five years of data, and the completion of the Banking Union. It then sets out a four-phase transition governed by thresholds rather than dates, including the constitutional routes that Germany, France and the other founding states must take, a timetable of steps, a first-year sequence, and the legal settlement with the Union. Three stress tests and a lawful exit procedure complete the design. The report concludes that the EFS is technically and economically feasible, and that its binding constraint is political will.

Keywords: European Federal State; feasibility study; federalism; fiscal union; European defence; constitutional design; federal transition; subsidiarity; European integration


Executive Summary


Report I established why Europe needs a European Federal State: in five domains, the monetary-fiscal order, financial stability, defence, foreign policy and the external frontier, the functions of sovereignty have moved beyond the reach of any single nation-state, and every arrangement compatible with national sovereignty fails at the point where it would have to relocate democratic authority. This report asks the second question: whether such a state can be built, by what design, at what cost, and over what time. Its answer is that the EFS is technically and economically feasible, that every component has a design, a precedent and a path, and that the constraint that remains is political will.

The EFS would be a federal state of limited competence. It would hold exclusive authority only in the five domains, under a Supremacy Clause bounded by an enumeration of federal powers, and every other competence, including health, social policy, policing, civil and criminal law and local government, would remain with the states. Education, culture and the media would not be federal competences; the federation could offer common standards and programmes, which each state would be free to adopt or decline. The Union's existing federal elements, the single market, competition law and, within the scope of Union law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, would continue to apply to all its members.

Its institutions are designed to avoid the weaknesses of both the present Union and the familiar federal models. A Federal Chamber elected by the citizens and a States Chamber representing state governments with weighted votes would share legislative power, and the right of legislative initiative would pass from the Commission to the elected chamber and the federal government. The executive would be parliamentary: a Federal Chancellor elected by the Federal Chamber and removable only by a constructive vote of no confidence, with an indirectly elected Federal President as head of state, so that the federation has a government that can act without the competing mandates of a directly elected presidency. A Federal Constitutional Court would police the boundary between federal and state power, and any state could bring a case under the subsidiarity guarantee.

The fiscal order is built as insurance rather than redistribution. A Unified Federal Ministry of Finance would manage a federal budget of about 4.5 percent of the participating states' GDP, of which about 2.6 percent would replace existing national or Union expenditure, so that about 1.9 percent is new spending, most of it investment that Europe requires in any case. Common European Federal Bonds would create a safe asset of about 9 trillion euros. Legacy debt up to 60 percent of each state's GDP would be exchanged for federal bonds over ten years, while each state would continue to pay the interest on its own share and debt above the threshold would remain the responsibility of the state that incurred it. A Fiscal Transfer Mechanism would pay out automatically when a state's unemployment rose above its own recent average; simulated on the data of 2000 to 2025, it would never have run a deficit, and its experience-rating rule returns any state that draws more than it pays to balance. Federal deposit insurance and a federal backstop would complete the Banking Union and break the loop between banks and their governments.

The security order turns money already committed into a single force. A Unified Federal Command Structure would absorb national forces in tranches, organised in linguistic divisions under a common command, and would buy for the whole federal force. The EFS would form the European pillar of NATO. A single foreign policy would be decided by majority, and urgent decisions by a Federal Security Council, with a strictly limited emergency power to respond to an armed attack. A federal border and coast guard and a federal asylum agency would control the external frontier as a single border. A European Federal Intelligence Agency would absorb foreign intelligence and counter-terrorism functions. The French nuclear deterrent would be linked to federal defence in three stages, the last of which would require a French referendum and the resolution of the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The transition proceeds in four phases: political consensus and the constitutional treaty, security and administrative integration, fiscal deepening, and full federalisation. Each begins only when legal, democratic, material and fiscal thresholds are met. The founding phase would take three to five years, the security phase five to ten, the fiscal phase about a decade, so that full federalisation would be reached in roughly a generation. Defence comes first because it is the most urgent mismatch and the one on which public support is broadest. Every phase completed would leave Europe more secure, even if the next were delayed. The founding phase must also carry each founding state through its own constitutional route: Germany can join a federal state only by a new constitution adopted by the German people under Article 146 of the Basic Law, France by referendum or by Congress under Article 89, Italy, Spain, Poland and the Netherlands by the qualified majorities or referendums their constitutions prescribe. These routes are set out, with the timetable of steps and the sequence of the first twelve months, in the transition chapter.

The design has been tested against three crises: a Russian incursion into a Baltic state, a sovereign debt crisis in a large high-debt state, and the election of a hostile government within the federation. In each, the EFS would act where the present Union is paralysed, without abolishing the risks that every federation lives with. A lawful exit procedure, modelled on the principle of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec reference, would allow a state to leave after a clear majority on a clear question, so that the EFS is built to last without holding its members by force.

The legal relationship with the Union is the largest unresolved obstacle. A federation of some member states founded by its own treaty is possible on the precedents of the Fiscal Compact and the European Stability Mechanism, but its action within the Union in its domains requires the agreement of the other member states. Much of the federal state already exists in prototype: common borrowing in NextGenerationEU, common stabilisation in SURE, common procurement in SAFE, common supervision in the Banking Union and common frontier management in Frontex. What the EFS adds is the political authority, the revenue and the permanence that turn prototypes into the working parts of a state.



 

Table of Contents

 

Abstract

Executive Summary

Introduction: Europe in 2026 and the Question of Feasibility

Chapter 1. The Materials a Federal Constitution Can Draw On

Chapter 2. Three Kinds of Feasibility and the Constitutional Design

Chapter 3. Defence, Diplomacy, the Frontier and Intelligence

Chapter 4. The Fiscal Union: Treasury, Debt, Stabiliser and Markets

Chapter 5. Identity, Culture and the Sources of Legitimacy

Chapter 6. The Transition: Four Phases, Thresholds and the First Year

Chapter 7. Stress Tests, Internal Threats and the Right to Leave

Chapter 8. The European Federal State in the World

Conclusion: A Federal State That Can Be Built

Declarations

References

Appendix A. Constitutional Ratification Routes and Stakes of the Founding States

Appendix B. The Fiscal Transfer Mechanism: Parameters, Data and Simulation Results, 2000 to 2025

 

 


 

Introduction: 


Europe in 2026 and the Question of Feasibility

 

 



In the autumn of 2026, Europe presents a spectacle that few of its citizens expected to see in their lifetimes. A war that began with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 continues on the continent's eastern edge, with formal negotiations stalled since February 2026 (Congressional Research Service 2026). The United States, whose guarantee has underwritten European security since 1949, now offers that guarantee on conditions. Governments that only a few years ago assured their citizens that war between European states belonged to the past now advise them to keep food, water and medicine at home: the European Commission asked every household in the Union in March 2025 to prepare to manage alone for at least seventy-two hours, Sweden asks its residents to prepare for a week or more, and on 22 October 2026 the United Kingdom launched its own "Be Ready" campaign. In the same month, protests over the cost of living, public services and cuts in public spending turned to rioting, looting and arson in France and Italy, to clashes with police in Belgium and Albania, and to mass demonstrations in Spain, Portugal and Greece. On 31 October 2026, the third consecutive Saturday of national protest in France, about 320,000 people demonstrated across the country according to official figures, and the government deployed some 70,000 police officers and gendarmes to contain them, roughly one officer for every four or five demonstrators, while at least 296 people were arrested by the early evening (Agencia EFE 2026). A state that must mobilise a force of that size against its own citizens, Saturday after Saturday, merely to keep its streets in order is governing by force rather than by consent. The number in the streets is not the measure. The measure is that a political system which can keep order only in this way has forfeited the legitimacy on which order ordinarily rests.

These events have local causes, and they do not share a single direction. But they share a meaning. The states of Europe are no longer able to give their citizens what states exist to give: protection from external danger, stability of livelihood, and public order. A government that cannot guarantee its citizens' security without asking them to store food, cannot finance its public services without provoking revolt, and cannot keep order when its streets fill with protest, has not merely made policy mistakes. It is approaching the limit of what its political form can do. The European nation-state, the form that has organised the continent's political life for two centuries, is in 2026 losing its grip on the conditions it claims to govern, and the political systems built upon it are under a strain that their ordinary instruments cannot relieve.

Two questions follow, and this study answers them in two reports. The first is why the crisis has taken this form, and whether any existing arrangement can resolve it. Report I addresses that question (Zhong 2026). It diagnoses the crisis as ideological in a precise sense, a mismatch between the national scale at which Europeans still locate sovereignty and the continental scale at which the decisive forces of their security and prosperity now operate, and it shows that every arrangement compatible with national sovereignty, intergovernmental coordination, differentiated integration, incremental treaty reform and reliance on the Atlantic alliance, fails at the point where it would have to relocate democratic authority. The second question is whether the alternative that Report I identifies, a European Federal State (EFS), can actually be built: whether it is a political project that the Europe of the twenty-first century can realise, or an idea that belongs only in the history of political thought. That second question is the subject of the present report.

The question is not new, and that is precisely what makes it serious. Europe has been united before, many times and in many forms. Rome governed the continent from Britain to Syria under a single law. Charlemagne united most of western and central Europe under a single crown. The Holy Roman Empire held together hundreds of territories under layered authority for nine centuries. Latin Christendom gave the whole continent a common faith, a common learned language and a common law above its kings. Napoleon imposed a single code of law from Madrid to Warsaw. The idea of a united Europe is therefore not a modern invention, and the peoples of Europe are not strangers to common government. Yet every one of those unions was achieved by conquest, by dynasty or by faith, and every one of them came apart. The question that the present moment poses is different: whether the peoples of Europe, who have never united as a single federal state by their own free and democratic choice, can now do so, and whether a federation built in that way could govern what their separate states can no longer govern.

The question is also not abstract. It can be answered only by testing the federal idea against the materials that Europe actually possesses in 2026 and the dangers it actually faces. This report therefore proceeds as a feasibility study proceeds. It asks of each component of a European Federal State what it must do, on what existing institutions it can build, how it must be designed, what it would cost, and what could make it fail. It then asks how the components are assembled over time, in what order, by what legal acts, and under what conditions each step may begin. It does not assume its conclusion. The point of a feasibility study is to discover whether a proposal survives contact with reality. The question it puts, in the conditions of 2026, is whether the European Federal State is a utopia, an ideal republic that history will leave on paper, or Europe's last remedy, a mission that history has now made unavoidable.

The report is written so that it could be used. Report I said in its preface that if the Union wished to set up the European Federal State tomorrow, the second report should allow it to begin at once. That is the standard applied here. The constitutional treaty is specified in its essential articles. The budget is specified line by line, with its revenue sources and the constitutional rules that bound it. The treatment of each state's debt is specified to the percentage point. The stabiliser is specified by its trigger, its payment rate, its cap and its clawback. The command structure is specified by the sequence in which forces transfer. The transition is specified by phase, by threshold, by step and by month for its first year, and the constitutional route that each founding state must take is named. Where a design choice could reasonably have gone another way, the alternative is stated and the reason for the choice given. Where a component depends on a decision that cannot be taken in advance, such as the membership that ratification produces or the agreement of the other member states of the Union, the dependence is stated rather than hidden.

Three kinds of statement are kept apart throughout. Statements of fact concern what exists in 2026: the treaties, the budgets, the debt ratios, the defence expenditure, the instruments the Union has adopted. Statements of design concern what this report proposes: a constitution, a fiscal system, a command structure, a transition. Statements of inference concern what the proposed design would produce if adopted, such as lower borrowing costs, greater deterrent credibility and savings from integrated procurement. Facts are sourced; designs are argued; inferences are stated with the assumptions on which they depend.

 


 

Chapter 1


The Materials a Federal Constitution Can Draw On

 



Federations have been built among peoples of different languages and religions; Switzerland and India are the most striking cases (Wheare 1963; Watts 2008). A common past is not the test of a federation: every earlier union of Europe rested on one, and none was chosen by its peoples. Report I made this argument at length and showed that the idea of indivisible national sovereignty is the younger of Europe's two political traditions, preceded by a much longer experience of layered and shared authority (Report I, Chapter 2). What the common past supplies to a feasibility study is narrower and more useful: a stock of law, concepts and institutional habits on which a federal constitution can draw, so that Europeans who read it find in it nothing foreign. This chapter identifies that stock, and it identifies the one historical union whose failure the EFS must understand because it is the union the EFS most resembles.

The first material is a common legal vocabulary. A federation whose citizens speak twenty-four official languages must govern through translation, and translation must carry not only words but concepts. The concepts of European law and politics, citizen, right, contract, parliament, constitution, sovereignty, travel easily among European languages, not because of the common Indo-European descent of most of them but because most of these words derive from the Latin and Greek vocabulary of Roman law and the medieval Church, which every European language, Indo-European or not, has borrowed. Hungarian, Finnish and Estonian, which lie outside the Indo-European family, and Maltese, which is Semitic, carry the same legal concepts in borrowed or calqued form. The legal vocabulary of a federal constitution would therefore be recognisable in Lisbon, Warsaw and Helsinki, even where the words differ. That is an advantage that many multilingual states, whose languages share neither roots nor conceptual vocabulary, do not enjoy, and it bears directly on the cost and the speed of drafting, translating and adjudicating a federal constitution.

The second material is the civil law tradition. The modern law of continental Europe descends from the codification of Roman law under Justinian in the sixth century, recovered and taught at Bologna from the late eleventh century, and expressed in the French Civil Code of 1804 and the German Civil Code of 1900 (Berman 1983). Because the legal systems of most member states share this conceptual structure, the harmonisation of company, insolvency and commercial contract law that a single capital market requires is a practical task of drafting rather than a clash of incompatible traditions. Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, whose private law carries a common-law inheritance, have lived within Union law for decades, and the Union's own legislation already bridges the two traditions in company law, consumer law and financial regulation. Rome also gave Europe the idea of citizenship as a legal status rather than an ethnic identity: after the Constitutio Antoniniana of 212 extended citizenship to almost all free inhabitants of the empire, a Gaul or a Syrian was a Roman citizen without ceasing to be a Gaul or a Syrian. That idea, a person's rights depending on membership of a system of law rather than descent from a people, is the foundation of the federal citizenship proposed in Chapter 2, which is added to national citizenship and does not replace it.

The third material is the idea of law above rulers, and here the religious history of the continent matters for a specific institutional reason rather than as a source of identity. Every great religion has created networks that cross political borders. What Latin Christendom produced was distinctive: a single, institutionalised hierarchy, the Roman Church under the papacy, with its own law, its own courts and its own claim to judicial authority over kings. The struggle between popes and emperors over the investiture of bishops ended, in the Concordat of Worms of 1122, with a division of authority that neither side could abolish, so that every medieval European lived under at least two legal orders at once (Berman 1983). Because no single authority could claim total jurisdiction, jurists on both sides developed theories of limited and divided power, of consent and representation, and of law as something above any particular ruler. The institutions of royal government, chanceries, courts of appeal, professional jurists, were modelled on those of the Church and often staffed by clergy (Tilly 1990). The same tradition later produced the principle of subsidiarity, formulated in Catholic social teaching in the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno of 1931 and written into the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which Chapter 2 makes the boundary of federal power.

The comparison between Christendom and the Union also illuminates the feasibility problem in a way that a feasibility study must not pass over. Christendom derived its legitimacy from the sacred and expressed its unity culturally, through a uniform religion, Latin as a common tongue and a shared feudal order. The Union derives its legitimacy from treaties, democratic procedure and the rule of law, and has built its unity from the bottom up through economic and legal integration. The Union is therefore attempting what Christendom never attempted: unity without the binding force of a shared faith. That is the deepest reason the political identity of a European people remains thinner than the historical depth of Christendom. It is also the EFS's decisive advantage. A unity grounded in faith could not survive the division of faith, and Christendom did not survive the Reformation. A unity grounded in law and consent can survive religious pluralism, secularisation and immigration, because it asks citizens to share institutions rather than beliefs. The EFS inherits from Christendom its transnational reach and its idea of law above rulers, and grounds them in the secular legitimacy that the Union has built.

The fourth material is the experience of composite and federal government within the member states themselves. Germany, Austria and Belgium are federal states; Spain and Italy have devolved substantial authority to their regions; Switzerland, outside the Union, has governed four language communities and two confessions through a federal constitution since 1848. The German Basic Law in particular supplies working models that the EFS adopts: a chamber representing state governments with weighted votes, a chancellor removable only by a constructive vote of no confidence, a constitutional court that arbitrates between levels of government, and a system under which most taxes are collected by the states on behalf of the federation. These are not foreign imports. They are institutions under which more than a hundred million Europeans already live.

The fifth material is the Enlightenment's conception of political order. Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers, Kant's vision of a federation of free republics as the condition of perpetual peace, and the declarations of rights that followed the American and French revolutions are the intellectual foundations of every modern constitution in Europe and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Kant 1795). A federal bill of rights built on the Charter asks no European to accept a conception of rights that is not already written into the constitution of the state in which he or she lives.

One historical union deserves separate attention because it is the union the EFS most resembles and because its fate is the warning the EFS must heed. The Holy Roman Empire held together several hundred territories for nine centuries under an emperor whose authority was real but limited, an Imperial Diet in which the estates bargained collectively, and two supreme courts to which subjects could appeal against their own princes (Wilson 2016). It managed religious coexistence after 1555 and 1648 through legal procedures rather than war, and protected small territories against large ones. It was destroyed not by internal revolt but by external military defeat at the hands of Napoleon, because it could not concentrate force and revenue when its survival required it. The Dutch Republic and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the other two layered orders of early modern Europe, met the same end for the same reason, and the authors of the American constitution studied all three before designing a federation that could tax, raise an army and act without the consent of every member (Hamilton and Madison 1788). Report I drew the lesson for the diagnosis: a layered order that allows any member to veto the common defence will be divided by its enemies. This report draws the lesson for the design. The EFS protects its small states, its languages and its legal pluralism, as the Empire did; it also holds, as the Empire did not, the exclusive power to tax for its purposes, to command its forces and to decide by majority in the five domains. The materials of Europe's layered past supply the form of the federation. The failure of that past supplies the one thing the form must add.

What matters for feasibility is therefore specific. The materials from which a federal constitution must be built, a common legal vocabulary, a shared private-law tradition, a citizenship defined by law, an idea of law above rulers and a principle of subsidiarity, a working experience of federal institutions and a shared conception of rights, already exist in every participating state. The EFS asks Europeans to transfer five functions of sovereignty, not to adopt a foreign political culture. It does not ask them to abandon their nations. It asks them to recognise that nations can flourish within a federal state, as Bavaria flourishes within Germany and Geneva within Switzerland, and it asks them to give that federal state the one capacity that their earlier layered unions lacked.

 


 

Chapter 2


Three Kinds of Feasibility and the Constitutional Design

 

 


Three feasibilities and three defects

Any honest assessment of the EFS must begin by distinguishing three kinds of feasibility. Technical feasibility asks whether the institutions of a federation can be designed and operated: whether a federal treasury can collect taxes, a federal command can direct armed forces, a federal court can arbitrate disputes. Economic feasibility asks whether the EFS can be financed and whether it would improve the economic performance of its members. Political feasibility asks whether governments and electorates will consent to create it. The EFS is technically and economically feasible. Every institution it requires exists already in some form, either in the Union or in the federal member states, and the fiscal model set out in Chapter 4 shows that a federal budget of 4.5 percent of GDP can be financed largely by reallocating existing national expenditure. The EFS is politically and chronologically difficult. Its creation requires member states to cede core powers, and every national political system contains forces, parties, bureaucracies, constitutional courts, that will resist the cession.

The difficulty must not be confused with impossibility. Report I established that in the five domains, the monetary-fiscal order, financial stability, defence, foreign policy and the external frontier, the functions of sovereignty have moved beyond national reach, and that every alternative compatible with national sovereignty fails at the point where it would have to relocate democratic authority (Report I, Chapters 3 to 8). The present report takes that conclusion as its premise. Its question is whether a federal state limited to those five domains can be designed, financed, defended and founded. The political obstacles are high; what matters is whether they can be lowered by design and overcome by the pressure of events (Riker 1964; Volden 2004).

The design rests on one distinction. The Union already has federal elements: its law has direct effect and primacy within its competences, its Parliament is directly elected and its Court binds member states (Sonnicksen 2022). In the five domains, however, it remains confederal, because authority rests with the member states, decisions require unanimity and the Union can neither tax citizens directly nor command forces. The EFS would complete the transition from confederation to federation in exactly those five domains, with a Supremacy Clause, direct federal taxation and a federal executive responsible to an elected legislature, and leave the Union's existing federal elements and every other competence as they are.

Necessity does not remove difficulty. The strongest objections to the EFS are not those of its opponents but those that its supporters must admit. Three defects of the federal idea are serious enough to threaten its feasibility, and the constitutional design answers each.

The first is the irreversibility of sovereignty cession. Federation requires member states to cede permanently core powers over the military, foreign policy, public finance and border control. For historically established sovereign nations, this is politically agonising. Unlike a treaty, which can in principle be renegotiated or abandoned, a federal constitution is designed to endure, and the powers it transfers are designed not to return. Electorates uncertain about the EFS's performance will hesitate to make a transfer they cannot reverse. The EFS meets this defect in two ways. It limits the transfer to five domains and leaves every other competence with the states, so that what is ceded is narrow and specified. And it provides, as Chapter 7 sets out, a lawful exit procedure under which a participating state can leave the EFS after a clear majority in a referendum and a negotiated separation. Federation is designed to endure, but it is not a prison.

The second is the fear of a transfer union: that wealthier states will make large-scale, long-term fiscal transfers to poorer ones, and that the taxpayers of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and the Nordic members will be asked to finance the public budgets of other states without limit. This fear is legitimate and must be met by design rather than dismissed. Four principles govern the fiscal transfers of the EFS. The first is strict accountability: an independent federal audit authority, with powers comparable to those of the European Court of Auditors but with direct enforcement authority, would ensure that federal funds transferred to states are used for productive investment and for stabilisation in recessions, not to finance recurrent deficits; misused funds would be recovered, and repeated misuse would suspend access to discretionary federal programmes. The second is limits: automatic stabilisation payments would be capped at 1.5 percent of the recipient's GDP in any year and subject to experience rating, so that a state that drew more than it contributed would repay through higher contributions in the years of its recovery; discretionary investment transfers would be time-limited and tied to specific projects; and during the first phase of the fiscal union all transfers would be subject to an overall cap. The third is reciprocity: stable development of poorer regions expands the European market on which the export economies of the wealthier states depend, and a stabiliser designed as insurance against cyclical shocks is not a system of permanent structural redistribution. The fourth is tax sharing rather than transfers: a large share of federal revenue would come from taxes levied uniformly by the EFS and spent under federal rules, so that no national taxpayer pays another nation's bills; all taxpayers pay the same federal taxes for the same federal services. Federal spending will still differ from region to region, as it does in every federation, so tax sharing does not abolish redistribution; it makes it transparent and rule-bound.

The third defect is the fragmentation of European identity. Citizens identify primarily with their nation-state and only secondarily as Europeans, and the absence of a common language and a common mass culture makes it difficult to form a unified political subject in whose name a federal government could act. This defect is answered in two places. Report I showed that the argument that democracy requires a pre-existing demos inverts the history of every federation, in which a political people is formed by the institutions in which it participates (Report I, Chapter 8; Weiler 1995). Chapter 5 of the present report sets out the policies by which the EFS would govern many languages and cultures without erasing any, and the evidence that public consent in the two domains where the EFS would begin, defence and foreign policy, is already broad.

The constitutional treaty and the enumeration of powers

The founding instrument of the EFS is the European Federal Constitutional Treaty (EFCT). It is a treaty in form, because it is concluded among states, and a constitution in substance, because it creates a federal government directly authorised by citizens in referendums (Hueglin 2000). Its essential content can be set out in eight parts, and the Convention that drafts it, described in Chapter 6, would be bound to this scope.

The first part defines the EFS and its membership: a federal state formed by member states of the European Union that ratify the treaty, open to every member state of the Union that accepts it, and committed to respect Union law in every domain outside its exclusive competence.

The second part enumerates the competences. The exclusive federal competences are five: the monetary-fiscal order, meaning federal taxation within the enumerated list, the federal budget, federal debt and macroeconomic stabilisation, while monetary policy itself remains an exclusive competence of the Union exercised by the European Central Bank; financial stability, meaning federal deposit insurance, the federal backstop to bank resolution and federal securities regulation; defence, meaning the command, financing, procurement and deployment of the federal armed forces; foreign policy, meaning the representation of the EFS abroad, the conclusion of treaties within federal competence, sanctions and development policy; and the external frontier, meaning border control, asylum and return. A short list of shared competences follows, in which federal law sets a framework and the states legislate within it: the single market and the harmonisation of the economic law that directly affects it, cross-border energy networks, cross-border transport, and environmental standards with cross-border effect. Everything not enumerated is reserved to the states. The treaty would state in terms that health, social policy and social insurance, pensions, education, culture, the media, policing, civil and criminal law outside the shared competences, the organisation of local government and the relationship between churches and the state are matters for the states alone, and that in education, culture and the media the EFS may offer common standards and programmes which each state remains free to adopt or decline.

The third part contains the Supremacy Clause: federal law is the supreme law of the EFS within federal competence and overrides conflicting state law in those domains, and only in those domains. The clause is bounded by the enumeration, and the boundary is justiciable (Burchardt 2019). The American and Swiss experience shows that enumeration alone does not prevent the expansion of federal power by interpretation; it must be backed by a constitutional court with a mandate to police the boundary and by the states' standing to invoke it. The EFCT therefore provides that any state government, or any group of three state parliaments, may bring a case before the Federal Constitutional Court alleging that a federal measure exceeds federal competence or violates the principle of subsidiarity, and that the Court must decide such cases within a fixed period. This is a stronger guarantee than the Union's early-warning mechanism, under which national parliaments may only ask the Commission to reconsider a proposal.

The fourth part establishes the institutions, set out below. The fifth part contains the federal bill of rights, built on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, binding every exercise of federal power and binding state authorities when they implement federal law. The sixth part contains the fiscal constitution: the closed list of federal taxes, the balanced-budget rule over the cycle, the 60 percent ceiling on the assumption of legacy debt and the constitutional status of the stabiliser, as Chapter 4 specifies. The seventh part governs the relationship with the Union and with the other member states. The eighth part contains the procedures for amendment, for the accession of further states, for the periodic constitutional conventions and for the exit of a state.

The EFCT would be a short document. The Constitutional Treaty of 2004 asked voters to approve a text of about 480 pages that consolidated the existing Union treaties, and its length was itself an argument against it. The EFCT consolidates nothing. It creates a federal state of five competences and leaves the Union treaties in force for everything else. A text of the length of the German Basic Law, which can be read in an afternoon, is the standard the Convention should be set.

The legislature

Legislative power is shared between two chambers. The Federal Chamber is elected directly by the citizens of the participating states for a term of five years under a uniform federal electoral law, with seats allocated to states in proportion to population subject to a minimum of four seats for the smallest. The uniform law is a departure from the European Parliament, whose members are elected under twenty-seven national systems and whose seats are allocated by degressive proportionality so that a Maltese vote carries many times the weight of a German one. A chamber that elects a government must represent citizens equally, or the government it elects will be contested as the creature of the small states; the protection of small states belongs in the second chamber, not in the first.

The States Chamber represents the governments of the participating states. Each state casts between three and seven votes according to population, cast as a block by its delegation, on the model of the German Bundesrat (Hueglin and Fenna 2015), so that the largest states cannot dominate and the smallest are not reduced to irrelevance. The consent of the States Chamber is required for federal laws that affect the finances or the administration of the states, for the organic laws that set the parameters of the stabiliser and the federal taxes, for the accession of a new state and for constitutional amendments; on other federal legislation it holds a suspensive veto that the Federal Chamber may override by an absolute majority, so that the federation avoids the joint-decision trap in which every level of government holds a veto (Scharpf 1988). The right of legislative initiative belongs to the federal government and to the members of the Federal Chamber. The Commission's near-monopoly of initiative, which has made European elections elections without consequences, ends.

The executive and the head of state

The executive is parliamentary. A Federal Chancellor is elected by the Federal Chamber by an absolute majority of its members and can be removed only by a constructive vote of no confidence, in which the Chamber elects a successor in the same vote. The Chancellor appoints the federal ministers, whose appointment both chambers confirm, and the federal government must include ministers from at least one third of the participating states. The Chancellor, the Federal President and the President of the Federal Chamber may not all be citizens of the same state. The Chancellor's mandate comes directly from the outcome of federal elections: the parties that contest them will name their candidates for Chancellor, and the electorate will know that its vote decides who governs in the five domains.

A directly elected Federal President might seem the obvious answer to the Union's democratic deficit, and the 2025 dialogue from which this study grew proposed one. The design adopted here rejects it for a reason that the American experience makes plain. A president elected by the whole federal electorate holds a mandate that competes with those of the two chambers, and in a federation of more than twenty states and many parties, in which no single party will command a majority, the result would be deadlock between a president and a legislature each claiming to speak for the people. The United States has lived with that deadlock because its party system is simple and its constitution is old. A new federation of many parties cannot afford it. The German model, under which the government is the creature of the legislature and can be removed only by a majority ready to govern, produces stable governments in a fragmented party landscape, and it is the model adopted.

The Federal President is therefore head of state and constitutional guardian, not head of government. He or she is elected for a term of five years, renewable once, by a Federal Assembly composed of the members of both chambers and an equal number of delegates of the state parliaments, and exercises the functions that heads of state exercise in parliamentary systems: the promulgation of laws after a check of their constitutional form, the formal appointment of the Chancellor and the ministers, the representation of the EFS in ceremony, and the power to refer a law to the Federal Constitutional Court before promulgation. The President is also the guarantor of the constitution's procedures in a crisis: if the Federal Chamber cannot elect a Chancellor, the President may dissolve it and call new elections.

The courts

The judiciary of the EFS combines a clear supremacy of federal law within federal competence with respect for the procedural autonomy of state courts, following the American and German models. At its summit stands the Federal Constitutional Court, the final interpreter of the EFCT and arbiter of disputes between the EFS and the states and among the states. Below it sit federal courts of appeal with jurisdiction over federal law: federal taxation, the federal budget, the shared competences, federal defence and frontier law. State courts remain the courts of first instance for almost all litigation, applying federal law where it is relevant alongside their own law, with a right of appeal to the federal courts on questions of federal law, as national courts now apply Union law as courts of the Union (Zglinski 2023). The Court of Justice of the European Union continues to interpret Union law for the Union as a whole, including for the participating states in every matter that remains governed by Union law. Where a case before a federal court raises a question of the interpretation or validity of Union law, that court refers it to the Court of Justice under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as national courts do now. The Federal Constitutional Court has the final word on the EFCT and on the boundary between federal and state competence; the Court of Justice has the final word on Union law (Claes 2016).

The conflict between democratic sovereignty, expressed in elected parliaments, and judicial authority, expressed in constitutional courts, is inherent in every federation, and the EFS manages it by three rules. The Federal Constitutional Court is the final and supreme interpreter of the federal constitution, so that when a state parliament, or the Federal Chamber itself, passes a law that the Court finds unconstitutional, the ruling is final. Its judges are appointed for single non-renewable terms of twelve years, half elected by each chamber of the federal legislature by a two-thirds majority, so that no single party or coalition of states can capture the court; appointment for life or by the Federal President alone would protect the court's independence less well than election by supermajority, on the German model. And the Court adopts a doctrine of judicial restraint, intervening only when a law clearly violates the constitutional text and giving the greatest possible deference to the elected legislatures. The disputes between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice over the Public Sector Purchase Programme in 2020, and between the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Union in 2021, show what happens when the boundary between levels of law has no single arbiter (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 2020; Constitutional Tribunal of Poland 2021; Traser et al. 2020; Nagy 2023). In the EFS, supremacy is bounded: federal law prevails within federal competence, state constitutions prevail outside it, and one court decides where the boundary lies.

The relationship between the Federal Constitutional Court and the national constitutional courts of the participating states must be settled in the EFCT rather than left to be fought out in judgments. The treaty would provide that the national constitutional courts retain their full jurisdiction over state law and over the compatibility of state action with state constitutions (Komárek 2014), and that questions of the competence of the EFS under the EFCT are reserved to the Federal Constitutional Court, to which a national constitutional court must refer such a question when it arises. The founding referendums, in which each people approves the EFCT directly, are what make this allocation legitimate: a national court that reviewed the competence of a federation its own people had authorised by referendum would be setting itself above the people whose constitution it protects.

Subsidiarity as the boundary of federal power

The principle of subsidiarity holds that decisions should be taken at the lowest level of government able to take them effectively, and that a higher authority should act only where a lower one cannot. It entered European law in the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 and stands in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In the EFS it becomes the principle that defines the boundary of federal power, and it performs three functions. Politically, it is the guarantee to the states that the EFS will not interfere in local affairs: education, local policing, cultural funding, family law, health care, social insurance and the organisation of local government remain with the states, and this guarantee is the primary instrument for reducing nationalist resistance to federation. Constitutionally, it is a limit on federal power, enforced by the standing of the states before the Federal Constitutional Court described above. Practically, it ensures efficiency, because a federal bureaucracy is ill suited to manage local problems and subsidiarity leaves their management to those closest to them.

The EFS would have no single official language (Lacey 2013). The national languages designated in the EFCT, which would include the twenty-four official languages of the Union spoken in the participating states, would be official in the EFS, and a constitutional procedure would govern the recognition and use of regional and co-official languages, such as Catalan, Basque, Galician and Luxembourgish, in federal institutions. Federal legislation would be published in all official languages, citizens could address federal institutions in any of them, and members of the federal legislature could speak in any of them with interpretation. A federation that raised one language above the others would be read, correctly, as a federation dominated by its speakers. Working languages are a separate matter: the federal administration, the joint military command and the diplomatic service need common working languages, and English, French and German would serve, with English as the principal one. Since the departure of the United Kingdom, English is the first language of only a small minority of the EFS's citizens, chiefly in Ireland and Malta, so its use confers no national advantage on any large state; it is the common second language of the continent. In the federal courts and the federal legislature, French and German would be recognised as working languages alongside English, so that the two great legal cultures of the continent are represented in the EFS's legal reasoning.

Federal citizenship and symbols

Every citizen of a participating state would be a federal citizen, without any act of naturalisation, and would keep national citizenship alongside it. Federal citizens would have the right to vote and stand in federal elections wherever they live in the EFS; the right to move, reside, work and study in any participating state, which the Union already guarantees; the protection of the federal bill of rights against any exercise of federal power, enforceable before the federal courts; the right to address any federal institution in any official language and receive an answer in it; consular and diplomatic protection by the federal foreign service anywhere in the world; and the right to petition the Federal Chamber and to launch a federal citizens' initiative, building on the European Citizens' Initiative, which since 2012 has allowed one million citizens from at least seven member states to invite the Commission to propose legislation, but strengthened so that an initiative meeting its thresholds must be debated and voted on by the Federal Chamber. These rights add to national rights rather than replace them. Social rights, pensions, health care and education, remain national, because they are the core of national welfare states and belong under subsidiarity to the states. What federal citizenship adds is membership of the political community that governs the EFS's five domains, and the guarantee that in this community every citizen's vote counts in deciding its direction.

A political community needs symbols through which its members recognise it, and the EFS can draw on symbols the Union already uses. The flag of twelve gold stars on a blue field, adopted by the Council of Europe in 1955 and by the European Communities in 1985, and the anthem drawn from the final movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, are already recognised across the continent. The Constitutional Treaty of 2004 would have given them constitutional status; the Treaty of Lisbon removed them after the referendums of 2005, though sixteen member states declared that they would continue to treat them as symbols of common belonging. The EFS would restore them to its constitution, together with the motto United in diversity, a federal passport and a federal day, 9 May, the anniversary of the Schuman declaration. Symbols are not decoration. Their absence from the Union's legal order after 2007 expressed the hesitation of its members to acknowledge that they formed a community at all. A federation founded by referendum would have no such hesitation, and its symbols would be displayed alongside, never in place of, the flags and anthems of the states.

Amendment, convention and exit

The EFCT would be amended by a two-thirds majority in both chambers followed by ratification in two thirds of the participating states according to their constitutional requirements, and no amendment could extend the exclusive federal competences without referendums in every participating state. Every twenty years a constitutional convention, composed of elected representatives and citizens chosen by lot, would review the constitution and propose amendments, drawing on the experience of citizens' assemblies in Ireland, whose recommendations led to constitutional referendums in 2015 and 2018, and in France. The procedure for the exit of a state is set out in Chapter 7, with the stress tests to which it belongs; its principle is that there is no unilateral right of secession, but a constitutional duty to negotiate if a clear majority votes on a clear question to leave.

The Union's institutions and the federal executive

The EFS is founded by a treaty among some member states and does not amend the Union treaties, so the Union's institutions remain the Union's. The European Commission would remain an institution of the Union serving all its members, and could not be divided between the Union and the EFS without an amendment of the Union treaties. What the EFS takes from the Commission is its experience and part of its staff: the federal executive would be built as a new institution, staffed in part by officials who choose to transfer from the Commission in the domains of federal competence, and organised in ministries rather than portfolios. The federal ministers for finance, defence, foreign affairs, the frontier and the single market would be members of the Chancellor's government, confirmed by both chambers and accountable to the Federal Chamber. The federal administration would be small relative to its powers: the EFS governs five domains with large budgets, defence above all, but most of its spending flows through federal forces and federal funds rather than through a central bureaucracy, and most of its taxes are collected by national administrations on its behalf, as Chapter 6 sets out. The European Parliament would continue as the Parliament of the Union; its members elected in the participating states would sit as the provisional Federal Chamber until the first federal elections, so that the EFS has a legislature from its first day.

Reconciling the French and German traditions

The French and German constitutional traditions differ, and a federation founded principally by the two states must reconcile them. The EFS adopts a principle of pragmatic synthesis. Its legal system builds on the continental civil law tradition that France and Germany share, so that the common ground is large. The federal constitution draws on the consensus-seeking and federal spirit of the German Basic Law, with its chamber of states, its constructive vote of no confidence, its strong constitutional court and its explicit protection of human dignity in Article 1. The federal codes of commercial law draw on the clarity and systematic structure of the French codes. The aim is not to choose between traditions but to build a working system from both, and the recognition of French and German as working languages of the federal courts and legislature ensures that both legal cultures are present in the EFS's reasoning.

Two lessons and a warning from American federalism

The EFS can learn two crucial lessons from the history of American federalism. The first is the necessity of an effective executive. The United States succeeded where its predecessor, the Articles of Confederation of 1781, failed because the Constitution of 1787 created a government with a national mandate able to tax and to raise an army. Under the Articles, the central government depended on the voluntary contributions of the states, could not regulate commerce and could not compel compliance, exactly the weaknesses of the present Union in its confederal domains. The EFS learns this lesson through a strong parliamentary executive, a Chancellor who commands a legislative majority and can act, rather than through a directly elected president, for the reasons given above. The second is the power of the Supremacy Clause. Article VI of the American Constitution established that federal law is the supreme law of the land, giving the federal government the legal instrument to override conflicting state laws within its powers and ensuring that the Union could function. The EFCT contains an equally clear Supremacy Clause, bounded by the enumeration of federal competences.

America also offers a warning. The American Union held together in 1861 only through a civil war, because its constitution was silent on whether a state could leave. The EFS must not repeat that silence, and Chapter 7 gives its answer.

 

 


Chapter 3


Defence, Diplomacy, the Frontier and Intelligence

 



From money to force: the Unified Federal Command Structure

The Union's regulatory power, the Brussels Effect by which its rules on data, chemicals, competition and products become global norms (Bradford 2020), ends where military force begins. Report I traced the consequence in the defence and foreign-policy mismatches: the member states spent 418 billion euros on defence in 2025, yet buy, maintain and command twenty-seven separate forces, and any single government can halt the Union's external action (Report I, Chapters 5 and 6). The design problem is therefore not how to raise more money, since the Hague commitment of June 2025 already binds the allies to five percent of GDP for defence and security by 2035, of which 3.5 percent is for core defence (NATO 2025), but how to turn the money already committed into a single deployable force under a single political decision. The European Parliament's research service estimated in 2024 that the lack of cooperation in defence costs between 18 and 57 billion euros a year (European Parliamentary Research Service 2024). The answer of the EFS is the Unified Federal Command Structure (UFCS): a single command able to act on a single political decision, and a single procurement authority buying for the whole federal force (Howorth 2019).

The UFCS is headed by a Chief of the Federal Defence Staff, a serving officer appointed by the federal government for a term of four years and responsible to the Federal Defence Minister, who is in turn responsible to the Federal Chamber. Beneath the Chief of Staff stand a Joint Operations Command, which plans and conducts operations, and four component commands for land, air, maritime, and cyber and space forces, together with a Federal Logistics and Support Command. The headquarters of the component commands are distributed across the EFS, as Chapter 4 sets out for federal institutions generally: the maritime command on the Mediterranean or the Atlantic, the land command in central Europe, the air command in the north, the cyber and space command in a state with the relevant industrial base. The Joint Operations Command is co-located with the federal defence ministry.

The UFCS is formed by transferring to federal command, in tranches, the operational units, headquarters and procurement agencies of the participating states. The first tranche, in the first two years after the EFCT enters into force, transfers the strategic enablers that no single state can afford and that make Europe dependent on the United States: strategic airlift and air-to-air refuelling, satellite reconnaissance and communications, integrated air and missile defence, long-range precision strike and the stocks of munitions needed for high-intensity warfare. The first tranche also transfers the forces stationed on the eastern frontier and the multinational formations that already exist, the Eurocorps in Strasbourg and the German-Netherlands Corps, in which units of two national armies have served under one command since 1995, so that the federal force is present from the first year where deterrence matters most. The second tranche, in years three to five, transfers the air forces and navies, whose equipment is most standardised and whose operations are already conducted in NATO's common procedures and common language. The third tranche, from year five, transfers the remaining land forces. Each state retains under its own authority a territorial defence and reserve component, whose size and form it decides, for civil protection, home defence and the support of civil authorities, and the ceremonial units that express national tradition.

The design responds to the specific question of how a federal army can work across many languages. The answer is organisation along linguistic lines at the level where soldiers must communicate under stress, and a common working language at the level of command. Ground troops and tactical units are organised in linguistic divisions, French-speaking, German-speaking, Polish-speaking, Italian-speaking, Spanish-speaking and others, which preserve the national and regional identities that give units their cohesion and their traditions. Corps headquarters, the component commands, the joint command and the federal defence ministry work in English, as NATO's integrated commands already do. Linguistic divisions are an organisational choice rather than a proven model, and they bring their own constraints: logistics, communications and joint operations across divisions must work in the common language, and officers and specialists must move between divisions, so that language training is a core part of federal military education. The federal force recruits across all participating states; a state that maintains military service under its own law may offer its conscripts the choice of serving in the federal force, and the federal force pays and pensions its personnel under a single federal scheme.

Federal command is exercised by the Federal Defence Minister. The defence of federal territory against armed attack is a standing authorisation written into the EFCT, under the emergency procedure described below. Any deployment outside the territory of the EFS requires the prior approval of the Federal Chamber by an absolute majority, on a motion of the federal government stating the mandate, the size of the force and the duration, which the Chamber must renew annually. This rule follows the German parliamentary reservation and is what makes a federal army acceptable to electorates that fear its misuse: the force that defends them cannot be sent abroad by a government alone.

Procurement is the second function of the UFCS. A Federal Armaments Agency, built from the staff of the European Defence Agency, the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation and the national procurement offices that transfer to it, buys for the whole federal force. Its first task is to stop the proliferation of types: the 178 major weapon systems that European armies operated in 2015, including seventeen types of main battle tank against one in the United States, would be consolidated into a single federal inventory by buying no new type that duplicates an existing one and by retiring minority types as they reach the end of their service lives (European Political Strategy Centre 2015). Its second task is to give the European defence industry what it has never had, a single buyer placing long and predictable orders, so that firms can expand capacity, and to use that position to require cross-border consolidation of suppliers as a condition of the largest contracts. The share of a federal procurement authority's spending that would stay within Europe is a design choice, not a law of nature; the Agency's mandate would set a European preference qualified by the test of operational need, so that the federal force buys American where only American equipment exists and European wherever European equipment meets the requirement.

The EFS inside NATO

The formation of a unified federal military would change the structure of the Atlantic alliance. The EFS would form the European pillar of NATO, assuming primary responsibility for the conventional defence of Europe. Over time, the separate memberships of its participating states could be replaced by a single EFS membership, though this would require negotiation, because the North Atlantic Treaty contains no provision for a federation formed from existing members; in the near term, the participating states would remain parties to the treaty in their own right, and any arrangement under which they coordinate their positions on federal instructions would require the agreement of the other allies, since the North Atlantic Council decides by consensus among sovereign members. The federal force would be assigned to NATO's integrated command for the collective defence of the alliance area, as national forces are now, and the UFCS would be built to be interoperable with NATO procedures from the start, which is one reason its working language is English.


... ...


The external frontier

Beyond war and diplomacy lies the external frontier, which Report I showed to be common in its consequences and national in its defence (Report I, Chapter 7). The Pact on Migration and Asylum, applicable from 12 June 2026, introduces common screening and border procedures and a mechanism of mandatory but flexible solidarity, but its administration remains with the member states (Moutselos 2024).

The EFS would federalise the management of the external frontier, treating it as a single border. National border agencies at the external frontier would be replaced by a European Federal Border and Coast Guard, built on Frontex, whose standing corps of 10,000 officers is its nucleus, and on the national external-border services that transfer to it, funded and commanded by the federal government through a Federal Minister for the Frontier. Its officers would exercise the powers of border control on the territory of every participating state under federal law, which is the step Frontex cannot take, since its officers act under the command of the host state (Campesi 2018). Internal border checks among the participating states would be abolished in federal law as a consequence, and could be reintroduced only by a decision of the federal government for a limited period. The federal border service would be accountable in ways Frontex has not always been: its officers would be subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, an independent fundamental rights officer with powers of investigation would report to the Federal Chamber, and any person affected by its operations could bring a complaint before a federal tribunal (Marin 2024).

The frontier must also hold under pressure. In late July 2026 more than 1,500 people, most of them Moroccan nationals and a smaller number of Algerians, reached Ceuta by sea within a few days, and the enclave’s reception centre was overwhelmed (Brito 2026). Such an event tests capacities that no single city or state can supply, and the federal border service would hold them. It would keep a rapid-reaction reserve, deployable to any sector of the external frontier within forty-eight hours, so that a surge at one point is met by the resources of the whole federation rather than by the police of one city. It would apply the border procedure at the point of arrival, in reception facilities at the frontier, so that applicants from countries whose nationals are rarely granted protection receive an accelerated decision there and those refused are returned without entering the interior; the procedure may last at most twelve weeks from registration, after which the applicant must in principle be admitted to the territory, so that the federal agency would have to be staffed to decide within that period (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2024a). Where a third country or a hostile non-state actor deliberately encourages or facilitates such movements with the aim of destabilising the Union or a member state, and the movements are liable to put essential state functions at risk, the participating state concerned, acting with the federal government, may request authorisation to apply the temporary measures provided for in the Union’s regulation on crisis and force majeure, subject to the assessment, authorisation procedures and safeguards that it lays down (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2024b). Separately, the federal foreign ministry could suspend federal development assistance or visa facilitation to a third state whose conduct warrants it. These measures strengthen the frontier without closing it to those whom the law requires it to protect.

All asylum claims would be processed by a Federal Asylum Agency, in centres at the external frontier, in Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta, Croatia and on the eastern land border, funded and managed from the federal budget, so that the financial and administrative burden no longer falls on the states of arrival. The Agency would apply a single federal asylum law, built on the procedures introduced by the Pact (Apatzidou 2025), with a first-instance decision within a fixed period and an appeal to a federal asylum tribunal. Applicants granted protection would be distributed among the participating states according to a mandatory formula, weighted 40 percent by population and 60 percent by GDP in the preceding financial year, so that the richer states carry a larger share and the poorer a smaller one, and no state’s share depends on where the applicant happened to land. The formula carries a correction for the number already received: a state whose cumulative intake over the preceding ten years exceeds its share under the formula, as Sweden’s would after the arrivals of 2015 and 2016, receives no new allocation until its cumulative share has returned to the formula level.

The federal foreign ministry would negotiate and enforce return agreements with countries of origin and transit, giving the EFS the leverage in trade, visa and development policy that individual states lack, and the Agency would operate a single return service for rejected applicants and those without a right to remain. Admission for work, residence and naturalisation would remain national decisions, because they belong to the labour market and the social contract of each state, but the federal frontier would give those decisions a frontier that holds.

The cost of the system is bounded. The budget of the Federal Asylum Agency would be capped by the federal budget law at a fixed share of the preceding year’s federal revenue and published each year. When spending approaches the cap, the discretionary routes of entry, resettlement programmes, humanitarian visas and family reunification beyond the minimum that law requires, are suspended automatically and accelerated procedures are applied, while every claim to protection that law requires to be heard continues to be heard. Return is measured against a published annual target; if the rate falls below it for two consecutive years, the federal foreign ministry must apply visa restrictions and the suspension of federal development assistance to countries of origin that refuse to readmit their nationals. Reception conditions during the procedure are uniform across the EFS and paid by the federation, so that no state can be chosen for its benefits; once protection is granted, access to welfare is governed by the law of the receiving state alone, which may tie it to employment, language learning and years of residence, and the EFS creates no federal welfare entitlement of any kind. This design satisfies both north and south: the south gains federal responsibility for the frontier, and the north gains a frontier that is controlled.


 


——End of the Sample——





Author’s Note: The study is published as two companion reports. The second, The Revival of Europe: Strategic Feasibility of a European Federal State in the Twenty-First Century, runs to about thirty-six thousand words, with two appendices, and this excerpt of about twelve thousand words presents only its Executive Summary, Introduction, Chapters 1 and 2, and the opening and external-frontier sections of Chapter 3. The remaining chapters set out federal defence and foreign policy, the fiscal union, the four-phase transition with its timetable, and three stress tests; the appendices give each founding state’s ratification route and a simulation of the federal stabiliser. The first report, Ideological Crisis and the Case for a European Federal State, diagnoses the mismatch between national sovereignty and continental functions and shows why every alternative to federation fails at the same point. 

Both reports will be self-published as a book on Amazon in early 2027. Interested readers can contact me to request a PDF copy. Established academic or trade publishers interested in publishing this work are welcome to get in touch through the ‘Contact me’ form in the left sidebar.



Credits:

Conceptualised and Directed by: Juliet Zhong
2026 Edition Written with: Claude Opus 5.5 and Fable 5.1
Fact-checking and References: ChatGPT
First Edition (2025) Generated with: Gemini Flash

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