The Revival of Europe (Report II): Strategic Feasibility of a European Federal State in the Twenty-First Century
THE REVIVAL OF EUROPE
Strategic Feasibility of a European Federal State
in the Twenty-First Century
Juliet Zhong
Independent Researcher
London, United Kingdom | November 2026
This is the second of two companion reports. The first, The Revival
of Europe: Ideological Crisis and the Case for a European Federal State, was posted in October 2026. The present report was conceived and directed by
Juliet Zhong on the basis of her 2025 dialogue record and outline, drafted with
the assistance of Claude (Anthropic), and rewritten in November 2026. Factual
statements about the period 2024 to 2026 rest on the official documents and
data listed in the References.
Abstract
This report is the second of two companion studies on the
European Federal State (EFS). Report I argued that Europe's crisis is
ideological, a mismatch between the national scale at which sovereignty is
believed to reside and the continental scale at which it must now be exercised,
and that only a federal state limited to five domains can close it. Report II
asks whether that state can be built, and how. It sets out the constitutional
design: a federation of enumerated competence under a bounded Supremacy Clause,
a Federal Chamber and a States Chamber, a parliamentary executive, a Federal
Constitutional Court and a justiciable subsidiarity guarantee. It sets out the
security order: a Unified Federal Command Structure inside NATO, a single
foreign policy decided by majority, a Federal Security Council with a limited
emergency power, a federal frontier and asylum system, a federal intelligence
agency and a three-stage path for the French deterrent. It sets out the fiscal
order: a federal budget of 4.5 percent of GDP, federal bonds, the assumption of
legacy debt up to 60 percent of GDP with interest service retained by the
states, an automatic stabiliser tested on twenty-five years of data, and the
completion of the Banking Union. It then sets out a four-phase transition
governed by thresholds rather than dates, including the constitutional routes
that Germany, France and the other founding states must take, a timetable of
steps, a first-year sequence, and the legal settlement with the Union. Three
stress tests and a lawful exit procedure complete the design. The report
concludes that the EFS is technically and economically feasible, and that its
binding constraint is political will.
Keywords: European Federal State; feasibility study;
federalism; fiscal union; European defence; constitutional design; federal
transition; subsidiarity; European integration
Executive Summary
Report I established why Europe needs a European Federal
State: in five domains, the monetary-fiscal order, financial stability,
defence, foreign policy and the external frontier, the functions of sovereignty
have moved beyond the reach of any single nation-state, and every arrangement
compatible with national sovereignty fails at the point where it would have to
relocate democratic authority. This report asks the second question: whether
such a state can be built, by what design, at what cost, and over what time.
Its answer is that the EFS is technically and economically feasible, that every
component has a design, a precedent and a path, and that the constraint that
remains is political will.
The EFS would be a federal state of limited competence. It
would hold exclusive authority only in the five domains, under a Supremacy
Clause bounded by an enumeration of federal powers, and every other competence,
including health, social policy, policing, civil and criminal law and local
government, would remain with the states. Education, culture and the media
would not be federal competences; the federation could offer common standards
and programmes, which each state would be free to adopt or decline. The Union's
existing federal elements, the single market, competition law and, within the
scope of Union law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, would continue to apply
to all its members.
Its institutions are designed to avoid the weaknesses of
both the present Union and the familiar federal models. A Federal Chamber
elected by the citizens and a States Chamber representing state governments
with weighted votes would share legislative power, and the right of legislative
initiative would pass from the Commission to the elected chamber and the
federal government. The executive would be parliamentary: a Federal Chancellor
elected by the Federal Chamber and removable only by a constructive vote of no
confidence, with an indirectly elected Federal President as head of state, so
that the federation has a government that can act without the competing
mandates of a directly elected presidency. A Federal Constitutional Court would
police the boundary between federal and state power, and any state could bring
a case under the subsidiarity guarantee.
The fiscal order is built as insurance rather than
redistribution. A Unified Federal Ministry of Finance would manage a federal
budget of about 4.5 percent of the participating states' GDP, of which about
2.6 percent would replace existing national or Union expenditure, so that about
1.9 percent is new spending, most of it investment that Europe requires in any
case. Common European Federal Bonds would create a safe asset of about 9
trillion euros. Legacy debt up to 60 percent of each state's GDP would be exchanged
for federal bonds over ten years, while each state would continue to pay the
interest on its own share and debt above the threshold would remain the
responsibility of the state that incurred it. A Fiscal Transfer Mechanism would
pay out automatically when a state's unemployment rose above its own recent
average; simulated on the data of 2000 to 2025, it would never have run a
deficit, and its experience-rating rule returns any state that draws more than
it pays to balance. Federal deposit insurance and a federal backstop would
complete the Banking Union and break the loop between banks and their
governments.
The security order turns money already committed into a
single force. A Unified Federal Command Structure would absorb national forces
in tranches, organised in linguistic divisions under a common command, and
would buy for the whole federal force. The EFS would form the European pillar
of NATO. A single foreign policy would be decided by majority, and urgent
decisions by a Federal Security Council, with a strictly limited emergency
power to respond to an armed attack. A federal border and coast guard and a
federal asylum agency would control the external frontier as a single border. A
European Federal Intelligence Agency would absorb foreign intelligence and
counter-terrorism functions. The French nuclear deterrent would be linked to
federal defence in three stages, the last of which would require a French
referendum and the resolution of the obligations of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
The transition proceeds in four phases: political consensus
and the constitutional treaty, security and administrative integration, fiscal
deepening, and full federalisation. Each begins only when legal, democratic,
material and fiscal thresholds are met. The founding phase would take three to
five years, the security phase five to ten, the fiscal phase about a decade, so
that full federalisation would be reached in roughly a generation. Defence
comes first because it is the most urgent mismatch and the one on which public
support is broadest. Every phase completed would leave Europe more secure, even
if the next were delayed. The founding phase must also carry each founding
state through its own constitutional route: Germany can join a federal state
only by a new constitution adopted by the German people under Article 146 of
the Basic Law, France by referendum or by Congress under Article 89, Italy,
Spain, Poland and the Netherlands by the qualified majorities or referendums
their constitutions prescribe. These routes are set out, with the timetable of
steps and the sequence of the first twelve months, in the transition chapter.
The design has been tested against three crises: a Russian
incursion into a Baltic state, a sovereign debt crisis in a large high-debt
state, and the election of a hostile government within the federation. In each,
the EFS would act where the present Union is paralysed, without abolishing the
risks that every federation lives with. A lawful exit procedure, modelled on
the principle of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec reference, would
allow a state to leave after a clear majority on a clear question, so that the
EFS is built to last without holding its members by force.
The legal relationship with the Union is the largest
unresolved obstacle. A federation of some member states founded by its own
treaty is possible on the precedents of the Fiscal Compact and the European
Stability Mechanism, but its action within the Union in its domains requires
the agreement of the other member states. Much of the federal state already
exists in prototype: common borrowing in NextGenerationEU, common stabilisation
in SURE, common procurement in SAFE, common supervision in the Banking Union
and common frontier management in Frontex. What the EFS adds is the political
authority, the revenue and the permanence that turn prototypes into the working
parts of a state.
Table of Contents
Abstract
Executive Summary
Introduction: Europe in 2026 and the Question of Feasibility
Chapter 1. The Materials a Federal Constitution Can Draw On
Chapter 2. Three Kinds of Feasibility and the Constitutional
Design
Chapter 3. Defence, Diplomacy, the Frontier and Intelligence
Chapter 4. The Fiscal Union: Treasury, Debt, Stabiliser and
Markets
Chapter 5. Identity, Culture and the Sources of Legitimacy
Chapter 6. The Transition: Four Phases, Thresholds and the
First Year
Chapter 7. Stress Tests, Internal Threats and the Right to
Leave
Chapter 8. The European Federal State in the World
Conclusion: A Federal State That Can Be Built
Declarations
References
Appendix A. Constitutional Ratification Routes and Stakes of
the Founding States
Appendix B. The Fiscal Transfer Mechanism: Parameters, Data and Simulation Results, 2000 to 2025
Introduction:
Europe in 2026 and the Question of Feasibility
In the autumn of 2026, Europe presents a spectacle that few
of its citizens expected to see in their lifetimes. A war that began with the
Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 continues on the continent's
eastern edge, with formal negotiations stalled since February 2026 (Congressional
Research Service 2026). The United States, whose guarantee has underwritten
European security since 1949, now offers that guarantee on conditions.
Governments that only a few years ago assured their citizens that war between
European states belonged to the past now advise them to keep food, water and
medicine at home: the European Commission asked every household in the Union in
March 2025 to prepare to manage alone for at least seventy-two hours, Sweden
asks its residents to prepare for a week or more, and on 22 October 2026 the
United Kingdom launched its own "Be Ready" campaign. In the same
month, protests over the cost of living, public services and cuts in public
spending turned to rioting, looting and arson in France and Italy, to clashes
with police in Belgium and Albania, and to mass demonstrations in Spain,
Portugal and Greece. On 31 October 2026, the third consecutive Saturday of
national protest in France, about 320,000 people demonstrated across the
country according to official figures, and the government deployed some 70,000
police officers and gendarmes to contain them, roughly one officer for every
four or five demonstrators, while at least 296 people were arrested by the
early evening (Agencia EFE 2026). A state that must mobilise a force of that
size against its own citizens, Saturday after Saturday, merely to keep its
streets in order is governing by force rather than by consent. The number in
the streets is not the measure. The measure is that a political system which
can keep order only in this way has forfeited the legitimacy on which order
ordinarily rests.
These events have local causes, and they do not share a
single direction. But they share a meaning. The states of Europe are no longer
able to give their citizens what states exist to give: protection from external
danger, stability of livelihood, and public order. A government that cannot
guarantee its citizens' security without asking them to store food, cannot
finance its public services without provoking revolt, and cannot keep order
when its streets fill with protest, has not merely made policy mistakes. It is
approaching the limit of what its political form can do. The European
nation-state, the form that has organised the continent's political life for
two centuries, is in 2026 losing its grip on the conditions it claims to
govern, and the political systems built upon it are under a strain that their
ordinary instruments cannot relieve.
Two questions follow, and this study answers them in two
reports. The first is why the crisis has taken this form, and whether any
existing arrangement can resolve it. Report I addresses that question (Zhong
2026). It diagnoses the crisis as ideological in a precise sense, a mismatch
between the national scale at which Europeans still locate sovereignty and the
continental scale at which the decisive forces of their security and prosperity
now operate, and it shows that every arrangement compatible with national
sovereignty, intergovernmental coordination, differentiated integration,
incremental treaty reform and reliance on the Atlantic alliance, fails at the
point where it would have to relocate democratic authority. The second question
is whether the alternative that Report I identifies, a European Federal State
(EFS), can actually be built: whether it is a political project that the Europe
of the twenty-first century can realise, or an idea that belongs only in the
history of political thought. That second question is the subject of the
present report.
The question is not new, and that is precisely what makes it
serious. Europe has been united before, many times and in many forms. Rome
governed the continent from Britain to Syria under a single law. Charlemagne
united most of western and central Europe under a single crown. The Holy Roman
Empire held together hundreds of territories under layered authority for nine
centuries. Latin Christendom gave the whole continent a common faith, a common
learned language and a common law above its kings. Napoleon imposed a single
code of law from Madrid to Warsaw. The idea of a united Europe is therefore not
a modern invention, and the peoples of Europe are not strangers to common
government. Yet every one of those unions was achieved by conquest, by dynasty
or by faith, and every one of them came apart. The question that the present
moment poses is different: whether the peoples of Europe, who have never united
as a single federal state by their own free and democratic choice, can now do
so, and whether a federation built in that way could govern what their separate
states can no longer govern.
The question is also not abstract. It can be answered only
by testing the federal idea against the materials that Europe actually
possesses in 2026 and the dangers it actually faces. This report therefore
proceeds as a feasibility study proceeds. It asks of each component of a
European Federal State what it must do, on what existing institutions it can
build, how it must be designed, what it would cost, and what could make it
fail. It then asks how the components are assembled over time, in what order, by
what legal acts, and under what conditions each step may begin. It does not
assume its conclusion. The point of a feasibility study is to discover whether
a proposal survives contact with reality. The question it puts, in the
conditions of 2026, is whether the European Federal State is a utopia, an ideal
republic that history will leave on paper, or Europe's last remedy, a mission
that history has now made unavoidable.
The report is written so that it could be used. Report I
said in its preface that if the Union wished to set up the European Federal
State tomorrow, the second report should allow it to begin at once. That is the
standard applied here. The constitutional treaty is specified in its essential
articles. The budget is specified line by line, with its revenue sources and
the constitutional rules that bound it. The treatment of each state's debt is
specified to the percentage point. The stabiliser is specified by its trigger,
its payment rate, its cap and its clawback. The command structure is specified
by the sequence in which forces transfer. The transition is specified by phase,
by threshold, by step and by month for its first year, and the constitutional
route that each founding state must take is named. Where a design choice could
reasonably have gone another way, the alternative is stated and the reason for
the choice given. Where a component depends on a decision that cannot be taken
in advance, such as the membership that ratification produces or the agreement
of the other member states of the Union, the dependence is stated rather than
hidden.
Three kinds of statement are kept apart throughout.
Statements of fact concern what exists in 2026: the treaties, the budgets, the
debt ratios, the defence expenditure, the instruments the Union has adopted.
Statements of design concern what this report proposes: a constitution, a
fiscal system, a command structure, a transition. Statements of inference
concern what the proposed design would produce if adopted, such as lower
borrowing costs, greater deterrent credibility and savings from integrated procurement.
Facts are sourced; designs are argued; inferences are stated with the
assumptions on which they depend.
Chapter 1
The Materials a Federal Constitution Can Draw On
Federations have been built among peoples of different
languages and religions; Switzerland and India are the most striking cases (Wheare
1963; Watts 2008). A common past is not the test of a federation: every earlier
union of Europe rested on one, and none was chosen by its peoples. Report I
made this argument at length and showed that the idea of indivisible national
sovereignty is the younger of Europe's two political traditions, preceded by a
much longer experience of layered and shared authority (Report I, Chapter 2).
What the common past supplies to a feasibility study is narrower and more
useful: a stock of law, concepts and institutional habits on which a federal
constitution can draw, so that Europeans who read it find in it nothing
foreign. This chapter identifies that stock, and it identifies the one
historical union whose failure the EFS must understand because it is the union
the EFS most resembles.
The first material is a common legal vocabulary. A
federation whose citizens speak twenty-four official languages must govern
through translation, and translation must carry not only words but concepts.
The concepts of European law and politics, citizen, right, contract,
parliament, constitution, sovereignty, travel easily among European languages,
not because of the common Indo-European descent of most of them but because
most of these words derive from the Latin and Greek vocabulary of Roman law and
the medieval Church, which every European language, Indo-European or not, has
borrowed. Hungarian, Finnish and Estonian, which lie outside the Indo-European
family, and Maltese, which is Semitic, carry the same legal concepts in
borrowed or calqued form. The legal vocabulary of a federal constitution would
therefore be recognisable in Lisbon, Warsaw and Helsinki, even where the words
differ. That is an advantage that many multilingual states, whose languages
share neither roots nor conceptual vocabulary, do not enjoy, and it bears
directly on the cost and the speed of drafting, translating and adjudicating a
federal constitution.
The second material is the civil law tradition. The modern
law of continental Europe descends from the codification of Roman law under
Justinian in the sixth century, recovered and taught at Bologna from the late
eleventh century, and expressed in the French Civil Code of 1804 and the German
Civil Code of 1900 (Berman 1983). Because the legal systems of most member
states share this conceptual structure, the harmonisation of company,
insolvency and commercial contract law that a single capital market requires is
a practical task of drafting rather than a clash of incompatible traditions.
Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, whose private law carries a common-law inheritance,
have lived within Union law for decades, and the Union's own legislation
already bridges the two traditions in company law, consumer law and financial
regulation. Rome also gave Europe the idea of citizenship as a legal status
rather than an ethnic identity: after the Constitutio Antoniniana of 212
extended citizenship to almost all free inhabitants of the empire, a Gaul or a
Syrian was a Roman citizen without ceasing to be a Gaul or a Syrian. That idea,
a person's rights depending on membership of a system of law rather than
descent from a people, is the foundation of the federal citizenship proposed in
Chapter 2, which is added to national citizenship and does not replace it.
The third material is the idea of law above rulers, and here
the religious history of the continent matters for a specific institutional
reason rather than as a source of identity. Every great religion has created
networks that cross political borders. What Latin Christendom produced was
distinctive: a single, institutionalised hierarchy, the Roman Church under the
papacy, with its own law, its own courts and its own claim to judicial
authority over kings. The struggle between popes and emperors over the investiture
of bishops ended, in the Concordat of Worms of 1122, with a division of
authority that neither side could abolish, so that every medieval European
lived under at least two legal orders at once (Berman 1983). Because no single
authority could claim total jurisdiction, jurists on both sides developed
theories of limited and divided power, of consent and representation, and of
law as something above any particular ruler. The institutions of royal
government, chanceries, courts of appeal, professional jurists, were modelled
on those of the Church and often staffed by clergy (Tilly 1990). The same
tradition later produced the principle of subsidiarity, formulated in Catholic
social teaching in the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno of 1931 and written into the
Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which Chapter 2 makes the boundary of federal
power.
The comparison between Christendom and the Union also
illuminates the feasibility problem in a way that a feasibility study must not
pass over. Christendom derived its legitimacy from the sacred and expressed its
unity culturally, through a uniform religion, Latin as a common tongue and a
shared feudal order. The Union derives its legitimacy from treaties, democratic
procedure and the rule of law, and has built its unity from the bottom up
through economic and legal integration. The Union is therefore attempting what
Christendom never attempted: unity without the binding force of a shared faith.
That is the deepest reason the political identity of a European people remains
thinner than the historical depth of Christendom. It is also the EFS's decisive
advantage. A unity grounded in faith could not survive the division of faith,
and Christendom did not survive the Reformation. A unity grounded in law and
consent can survive religious pluralism, secularisation and immigration,
because it asks citizens to share institutions rather than beliefs. The EFS
inherits from Christendom its transnational reach and its idea of law above
rulers, and grounds them in the secular legitimacy that the Union has built.
The fourth material is the experience of composite and
federal government within the member states themselves. Germany, Austria and
Belgium are federal states; Spain and Italy have devolved substantial authority
to their regions; Switzerland, outside the Union, has governed four language
communities and two confessions through a federal constitution since 1848. The
German Basic Law in particular supplies working models that the EFS adopts: a
chamber representing state governments with weighted votes, a chancellor
removable only by a constructive vote of no confidence, a constitutional court
that arbitrates between levels of government, and a system under which most
taxes are collected by the states on behalf of the federation. These are not
foreign imports. They are institutions under which more than a hundred million
Europeans already live.
The fifth material is the Enlightenment's conception of
political order. Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers, Kant's
vision of a federation of free republics as the condition of perpetual peace,
and the declarations of rights that followed the American and French
revolutions are the intellectual foundations of every modern constitution in
Europe and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Kant 1795). A federal bill of
rights built on the Charter asks no European to accept a conception of rights
that is not already written into the constitution of the state in which he or
she lives.
One historical union deserves separate attention because it
is the union the EFS most resembles and because its fate is the warning the EFS
must heed. The Holy Roman Empire held together several hundred territories for
nine centuries under an emperor whose authority was real but limited, an
Imperial Diet in which the estates bargained collectively, and two supreme
courts to which subjects could appeal against their own princes (Wilson 2016).
It managed religious coexistence after 1555 and 1648 through legal procedures
rather than war, and protected small territories against large ones. It was
destroyed not by internal revolt but by external military defeat at the hands
of Napoleon, because it could not concentrate force and revenue when its
survival required it. The Dutch Republic and the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth, the other two layered orders of early modern Europe, met the same
end for the same reason, and the authors of the American constitution studied
all three before designing a federation that could tax, raise an army and act
without the consent of every member (Hamilton and Madison 1788). Report I drew
the lesson for the diagnosis: a layered order that allows any member to veto
the common defence will be divided by its enemies. This report draws the lesson
for the design. The EFS protects its small states, its languages and its legal
pluralism, as the Empire did; it also holds, as the Empire did not, the
exclusive power to tax for its purposes, to command its forces and to decide by
majority in the five domains. The materials of Europe's layered past supply the
form of the federation. The failure of that past supplies the one thing the
form must add.
What matters for feasibility is therefore specific. The
materials from which a federal constitution must be built, a common legal
vocabulary, a shared private-law tradition, a citizenship defined by law, an
idea of law above rulers and a principle of subsidiarity, a working experience
of federal institutions and a shared conception of rights, already exist in
every participating state. The EFS asks Europeans to transfer five functions of
sovereignty, not to adopt a foreign political culture. It does not ask them to
abandon their nations. It asks them to recognise that nations can flourish
within a federal state, as Bavaria flourishes within Germany and Geneva within
Switzerland, and it asks them to give that federal state the one capacity that
their earlier layered unions lacked.
Chapter 2
Three Kinds of Feasibility and the Constitutional Design
Three feasibilities and three defects
Any honest assessment of the EFS must begin by
distinguishing three kinds of feasibility. Technical feasibility asks whether
the institutions of a federation can be designed and operated: whether a
federal treasury can collect taxes, a federal command can direct armed forces,
a federal court can arbitrate disputes. Economic feasibility asks whether the
EFS can be financed and whether it would improve the economic performance of
its members. Political feasibility asks whether governments and electorates will
consent to create it. The EFS is technically and economically feasible. Every
institution it requires exists already in some form, either in the Union or in
the federal member states, and the fiscal model set out in Chapter 4 shows that
a federal budget of 4.5 percent of GDP can be financed largely by reallocating
existing national expenditure. The EFS is politically and chronologically
difficult. Its creation requires member states to cede core powers, and every
national political system contains forces, parties, bureaucracies,
constitutional courts, that will resist the cession.
The difficulty must not be confused with impossibility.
Report I established that in the five domains, the monetary-fiscal order,
financial stability, defence, foreign policy and the external frontier, the
functions of sovereignty have moved beyond national reach, and that every
alternative compatible with national sovereignty fails at the point where it
would have to relocate democratic authority (Report I, Chapters 3 to 8). The
present report takes that conclusion as its premise. Its question is whether a
federal state limited to those five domains can be designed, financed, defended
and founded. The political obstacles are high; what matters is whether they can
be lowered by design and overcome by the pressure of events (Riker 1964; Volden
2004).
The design rests on one distinction. The Union already has
federal elements: its law has direct effect and primacy within its competences,
its Parliament is directly elected and its Court binds member states (Sonnicksen
2022). In the five domains, however, it remains confederal, because authority
rests with the member states, decisions require unanimity and the Union can
neither tax citizens directly nor command forces. The EFS would complete the
transition from confederation to federation in exactly those five domains, with
a Supremacy Clause, direct federal taxation and a federal executive responsible
to an elected legislature, and leave the Union's existing federal elements and
every other competence as they are.
Necessity does not remove difficulty. The strongest
objections to the EFS are not those of its opponents but those that its
supporters must admit. Three defects of the federal idea are serious enough to
threaten its feasibility, and the constitutional design answers each.
The first is the irreversibility of sovereignty cession.
Federation requires member states to cede permanently core powers over the
military, foreign policy, public finance and border control. For historically
established sovereign nations, this is politically agonising. Unlike a treaty,
which can in principle be renegotiated or abandoned, a federal constitution is
designed to endure, and the powers it transfers are designed not to return.
Electorates uncertain about the EFS's performance will hesitate to make a
transfer they cannot reverse. The EFS meets this defect in two ways. It limits
the transfer to five domains and leaves every other competence with the states,
so that what is ceded is narrow and specified. And it provides, as Chapter 7
sets out, a lawful exit procedure under which a participating state can leave
the EFS after a clear majority in a referendum and a negotiated separation.
Federation is designed to endure, but it is not a prison.
The second is the fear of a transfer union: that wealthier
states will make large-scale, long-term fiscal transfers to poorer ones, and
that the taxpayers of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and the Nordic
members will be asked to finance the public budgets of other states without
limit. This fear is legitimate and must be met by design rather than dismissed.
Four principles govern the fiscal transfers of the EFS. The first is strict
accountability: an independent federal audit authority, with powers comparable
to those of the European Court of Auditors but with direct enforcement
authority, would ensure that federal funds transferred to states are used for
productive investment and for stabilisation in recessions, not to finance
recurrent deficits; misused funds would be recovered, and repeated misuse would
suspend access to discretionary federal programmes. The second is limits:
automatic stabilisation payments would be capped at 1.5 percent of the
recipient's GDP in any year and subject to experience rating, so that a state
that drew more than it contributed would repay through higher contributions in
the years of its recovery; discretionary investment transfers would be
time-limited and tied to specific projects; and during the first phase of the
fiscal union all transfers would be subject to an overall cap. The third is
reciprocity: stable development of poorer regions expands the European market
on which the export economies of the wealthier states depend, and a stabiliser
designed as insurance against cyclical shocks is not a system of permanent
structural redistribution. The fourth is tax sharing rather than transfers: a
large share of federal revenue would come from taxes levied uniformly by the
EFS and spent under federal rules, so that no national taxpayer pays another
nation's bills; all taxpayers pay the same federal taxes for the same federal
services. Federal spending will still differ from region to region, as it does
in every federation, so tax sharing does not abolish redistribution; it makes
it transparent and rule-bound.
The third defect is the fragmentation of European identity.
Citizens identify primarily with their nation-state and only secondarily as
Europeans, and the absence of a common language and a common mass culture makes
it difficult to form a unified political subject in whose name a federal
government could act. This defect is answered in two places. Report I showed
that the argument that democracy requires a pre-existing demos inverts the
history of every federation, in which a political people is formed by the
institutions in which it participates (Report I, Chapter 8; Weiler 1995).
Chapter 5 of the present report sets out the policies by which the EFS would
govern many languages and cultures without erasing any, and the evidence that
public consent in the two domains where the EFS would begin, defence and
foreign policy, is already broad.
The constitutional treaty and the enumeration of powers
The founding instrument of the EFS is the European Federal
Constitutional Treaty (EFCT). It is a treaty in form, because it is concluded
among states, and a constitution in substance, because it creates a federal
government directly authorised by citizens in referendums (Hueglin 2000). Its
essential content can be set out in eight parts, and the Convention that drafts
it, described in Chapter 6, would be bound to this scope.
The first part defines the EFS and its membership: a federal
state formed by member states of the European Union that ratify the treaty,
open to every member state of the Union that accepts it, and committed to
respect Union law in every domain outside its exclusive competence.
The second part enumerates the competences. The exclusive
federal competences are five: the monetary-fiscal order, meaning federal
taxation within the enumerated list, the federal budget, federal debt and
macroeconomic stabilisation, while monetary policy itself remains an exclusive
competence of the Union exercised by the European Central Bank; financial
stability, meaning federal deposit insurance, the federal backstop to bank
resolution and federal securities regulation; defence, meaning the command, financing,
procurement and deployment of the federal armed forces; foreign policy, meaning
the representation of the EFS abroad, the conclusion of treaties within federal
competence, sanctions and development policy; and the external frontier,
meaning border control, asylum and return. A short list of shared competences
follows, in which federal law sets a framework and the states legislate within
it: the single market and the harmonisation of the economic law that directly
affects it, cross-border energy networks, cross-border transport, and
environmental standards with cross-border effect. Everything not enumerated is
reserved to the states. The treaty would state in terms that health, social
policy and social insurance, pensions, education, culture, the media, policing,
civil and criminal law outside the shared competences, the organisation of
local government and the relationship between churches and the state are
matters for the states alone, and that in education, culture and the media the
EFS may offer common standards and programmes which each state remains free to
adopt or decline.
The third part contains the Supremacy Clause: federal law is
the supreme law of the EFS within federal competence and overrides conflicting
state law in those domains, and only in those domains. The clause is bounded by
the enumeration, and the boundary is justiciable (Burchardt 2019). The American
and Swiss experience shows that enumeration alone does not prevent the
expansion of federal power by interpretation; it must be backed by a
constitutional court with a mandate to police the boundary and by the states'
standing to invoke it. The EFCT therefore provides that any state government,
or any group of three state parliaments, may bring a case before the Federal
Constitutional Court alleging that a federal measure exceeds federal competence
or violates the principle of subsidiarity, and that the Court must decide such
cases within a fixed period. This is a stronger guarantee than the Union's
early-warning mechanism, under which national parliaments may only ask the
Commission to reconsider a proposal.
The fourth part establishes the institutions, set out below.
The fifth part contains the federal bill of rights, built on the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, binding every exercise of federal power and binding state
authorities when they implement federal law. The sixth part contains the fiscal
constitution: the closed list of federal taxes, the balanced-budget rule over
the cycle, the 60 percent ceiling on the assumption of legacy debt and the
constitutional status of the stabiliser, as Chapter 4 specifies. The seventh
part governs the relationship with the Union and with the other member states.
The eighth part contains the procedures for amendment, for the accession of
further states, for the periodic constitutional conventions and for the exit of
a state.
The EFCT would be a short document. The Constitutional
Treaty of 2004 asked voters to approve a text of about 480 pages that
consolidated the existing Union treaties, and its length was itself an argument
against it. The EFCT consolidates nothing. It creates a federal state of five
competences and leaves the Union treaties in force for everything else. A text
of the length of the German Basic Law, which can be read in an afternoon, is
the standard the Convention should be set.
The legislature
Legislative power is shared between two chambers. The
Federal Chamber is elected directly by the citizens of the participating states
for a term of five years under a uniform federal electoral law, with seats
allocated to states in proportion to population subject to a minimum of four
seats for the smallest. The uniform law is a departure from the European
Parliament, whose members are elected under twenty-seven national systems and
whose seats are allocated by degressive proportionality so that a Maltese vote
carries many times the weight of a German one. A chamber that elects a
government must represent citizens equally, or the government it elects will be
contested as the creature of the small states; the protection of small states
belongs in the second chamber, not in the first.
The States Chamber represents the governments of the
participating states. Each state casts between three and seven votes according
to population, cast as a block by its delegation, on the model of the German
Bundesrat (Hueglin and Fenna 2015), so that the largest states cannot dominate
and the smallest are not reduced to irrelevance. The consent of the States
Chamber is required for federal laws that affect the finances or the
administration of the states, for the organic laws that set the parameters of
the stabiliser and the federal taxes, for the accession of a new state and for
constitutional amendments; on other federal legislation it holds a suspensive
veto that the Federal Chamber may override by an absolute majority, so that the
federation avoids the joint-decision trap in which every level of government
holds a veto (Scharpf 1988). The right of legislative initiative belongs to the
federal government and to the members of the Federal Chamber. The Commission's
near-monopoly of initiative, which has made European elections elections
without consequences, ends.
The executive and the head of state
The executive is parliamentary. A Federal Chancellor is
elected by the Federal Chamber by an absolute majority of its members and can
be removed only by a constructive vote of no confidence, in which the Chamber
elects a successor in the same vote. The Chancellor appoints the federal
ministers, whose appointment both chambers confirm, and the federal government
must include ministers from at least one third of the participating states. The
Chancellor, the Federal President and the President of the Federal Chamber may
not all be citizens of the same state. The Chancellor's mandate comes directly
from the outcome of federal elections: the parties that contest them will name
their candidates for Chancellor, and the electorate will know that its vote
decides who governs in the five domains.
A directly elected Federal President might seem the obvious
answer to the Union's democratic deficit, and the 2025 dialogue from which this
study grew proposed one. The design adopted here rejects it for a reason that
the American experience makes plain. A president elected by the whole federal
electorate holds a mandate that competes with those of the two chambers, and in
a federation of more than twenty states and many parties, in which no single
party will command a majority, the result would be deadlock between a president
and a legislature each claiming to speak for the people. The United States has
lived with that deadlock because its party system is simple and its
constitution is old. A new federation of many parties cannot afford it. The
German model, under which the government is the creature of the legislature and
can be removed only by a majority ready to govern, produces stable governments
in a fragmented party landscape, and it is the model adopted.
The Federal President is therefore head of state and
constitutional guardian, not head of government. He or she is elected for a
term of five years, renewable once, by a Federal Assembly composed of the
members of both chambers and an equal number of delegates of the state
parliaments, and exercises the functions that heads of state exercise in
parliamentary systems: the promulgation of laws after a check of their
constitutional form, the formal appointment of the Chancellor and the
ministers, the representation of the EFS in ceremony, and the power to refer a
law to the Federal Constitutional Court before promulgation. The President is
also the guarantor of the constitution's procedures in a crisis: if the Federal
Chamber cannot elect a Chancellor, the President may dissolve it and call new
elections.
The courts
The judiciary of the EFS combines a clear supremacy of
federal law within federal competence with respect for the procedural autonomy
of state courts, following the American and German models. At its summit stands
the Federal Constitutional Court, the final interpreter of the EFCT and arbiter
of disputes between the EFS and the states and among the states. Below it sit
federal courts of appeal with jurisdiction over federal law: federal taxation,
the federal budget, the shared competences, federal defence and frontier law.
State courts remain the courts of first instance for almost all litigation,
applying federal law where it is relevant alongside their own law, with a right
of appeal to the federal courts on questions of federal law, as national courts
now apply Union law as courts of the Union (Zglinski 2023). The Court of
Justice of the European Union continues to interpret Union law for the Union as
a whole, including for the participating states in every matter that remains
governed by Union law. Where a case before a federal court raises a question of
the interpretation or validity of Union law, that court refers it to the Court
of Justice under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, as national courts do now. The Federal Constitutional Court has the
final word on the EFCT and on the boundary between federal and state
competence; the Court of Justice has the final word on Union law (Claes 2016).
The conflict between democratic sovereignty, expressed in
elected parliaments, and judicial authority, expressed in constitutional
courts, is inherent in every federation, and the EFS manages it by three rules.
The Federal Constitutional Court is the final and supreme interpreter of the
federal constitution, so that when a state parliament, or the Federal Chamber
itself, passes a law that the Court finds unconstitutional, the ruling is
final. Its judges are appointed for single non-renewable terms of twelve years,
half elected by each chamber of the federal legislature by a two-thirds
majority, so that no single party or coalition of states can capture the court;
appointment for life or by the Federal President alone would protect the
court's independence less well than election by supermajority, on the German
model. And the Court adopts a doctrine of judicial restraint, intervening only
when a law clearly violates the constitutional text and giving the greatest
possible deference to the elected legislatures. The disputes between the German
Federal Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice over the Public Sector
Purchase Programme in 2020, and between the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and
the Union in 2021, show what happens when the boundary between levels of law
has no single arbiter (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 2020;
Constitutional Tribunal of Poland 2021; Traser et al. 2020; Nagy 2023). In the
EFS, supremacy is bounded: federal law prevails within federal competence,
state constitutions prevail outside it, and one court decides where the
boundary lies.
The relationship between the Federal Constitutional Court
and the national constitutional courts of the participating states must be
settled in the EFCT rather than left to be fought out in judgments. The treaty
would provide that the national constitutional courts retain their full
jurisdiction over state law and over the compatibility of state action with
state constitutions (Komárek 2014), and that questions of the competence of the
EFS under the EFCT are reserved to the Federal Constitutional Court, to which a
national constitutional court must refer such a question when it arises. The
founding referendums, in which each people approves the EFCT directly, are what
make this allocation legitimate: a national court that reviewed the competence
of a federation its own people had authorised by referendum would be setting
itself above the people whose constitution it protects.
Subsidiarity as the boundary of federal power
The principle of subsidiarity holds that decisions should be
taken at the lowest level of government able to take them effectively, and that
a higher authority should act only where a lower one cannot. It entered
European law in the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 and stands in Article 5 of the
Treaty on European Union. In the EFS it becomes the principle that defines the
boundary of federal power, and it performs three functions. Politically, it is
the guarantee to the states that the EFS will not interfere in local affairs:
education, local policing, cultural funding, family law, health care, social
insurance and the organisation of local government remain with the states, and
this guarantee is the primary instrument for reducing nationalist resistance to
federation. Constitutionally, it is a limit on federal power, enforced by the
standing of the states before the Federal Constitutional Court described above.
Practically, it ensures efficiency, because a federal bureaucracy is ill suited
to manage local problems and subsidiarity leaves their management to those
closest to them.
The EFS would have no single official language (Lacey 2013).
The national languages designated in the EFCT, which would include the
twenty-four official languages of the Union spoken in the participating states,
would be official in the EFS, and a constitutional procedure would govern the
recognition and use of regional and co-official languages, such as Catalan,
Basque, Galician and Luxembourgish, in federal institutions. Federal
legislation would be published in all official languages, citizens could address
federal institutions in any of them, and members of the federal legislature
could speak in any of them with interpretation. A federation that raised one
language above the others would be read, correctly, as a federation dominated
by its speakers. Working languages are a separate matter: the federal
administration, the joint military command and the diplomatic service need
common working languages, and English, French and German would serve, with
English as the principal one. Since the departure of the United Kingdom,
English is the first language of only a small minority of the EFS's citizens,
chiefly in Ireland and Malta, so its use confers no national advantage on any
large state; it is the common second language of the continent. In the federal
courts and the federal legislature, French and German would be recognised as
working languages alongside English, so that the two great legal cultures of
the continent are represented in the EFS's legal reasoning.
Federal citizenship and symbols
Every citizen of a participating state would be a federal
citizen, without any act of naturalisation, and would keep national citizenship
alongside it. Federal citizens would have the right to vote and stand in
federal elections wherever they live in the EFS; the right to move, reside,
work and study in any participating state, which the Union already guarantees;
the protection of the federal bill of rights against any exercise of federal
power, enforceable before the federal courts; the right to address any federal
institution in any official language and receive an answer in it; consular and
diplomatic protection by the federal foreign service anywhere in the world; and
the right to petition the Federal Chamber and to launch a federal citizens'
initiative, building on the European Citizens' Initiative, which since 2012 has
allowed one million citizens from at least seven member states to invite the
Commission to propose legislation, but strengthened so that an initiative
meeting its thresholds must be debated and voted on by the Federal Chamber.
These rights add to national rights rather than replace them. Social rights,
pensions, health care and education, remain national, because they are the core
of national welfare states and belong under subsidiarity to the states. What
federal citizenship adds is membership of the political community that governs
the EFS's five domains, and the guarantee that in this community every
citizen's vote counts in deciding its direction.
A political community needs symbols through which its
members recognise it, and the EFS can draw on symbols the Union already uses.
The flag of twelve gold stars on a blue field, adopted by the Council of Europe
in 1955 and by the European Communities in 1985, and the anthem drawn from the
final movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, are already recognised across the
continent. The Constitutional Treaty of 2004 would have given them
constitutional status; the Treaty of Lisbon removed them after the referendums
of 2005, though sixteen member states declared that they would continue to
treat them as symbols of common belonging. The EFS would restore them to its
constitution, together with the motto United in diversity, a federal passport
and a federal day, 9 May, the anniversary of the Schuman declaration. Symbols
are not decoration. Their absence from the Union's legal order after 2007
expressed the hesitation of its members to acknowledge that they formed a
community at all. A federation founded by referendum would have no such
hesitation, and its symbols would be displayed alongside, never in place of,
the flags and anthems of the states.
Amendment, convention and exit
The EFCT would be amended by a two-thirds majority in both
chambers followed by ratification in two thirds of the participating states
according to their constitutional requirements, and no amendment could extend
the exclusive federal competences without referendums in every participating
state. Every twenty years a constitutional convention, composed of elected
representatives and citizens chosen by lot, would review the constitution and
propose amendments, drawing on the experience of citizens' assemblies in
Ireland, whose recommendations led to constitutional referendums in 2015 and
2018, and in France. The procedure for the exit of a state is set out in
Chapter 7, with the stress tests to which it belongs; its principle is that
there is no unilateral right of secession, but a constitutional duty to
negotiate if a clear majority votes on a clear question to leave.
The Union's institutions and the federal executive
The EFS is founded by a treaty among some member states and
does not amend the Union treaties, so the Union's institutions remain the
Union's. The European Commission would remain an institution of the Union
serving all its members, and could not be divided between the Union and the EFS
without an amendment of the Union treaties. What the EFS takes from the
Commission is its experience and part of its staff: the federal executive would
be built as a new institution, staffed in part by officials who choose to
transfer from the Commission in the domains of federal competence, and
organised in ministries rather than portfolios. The federal ministers for
finance, defence, foreign affairs, the frontier and the single market would be
members of the Chancellor's government, confirmed by both chambers and
accountable to the Federal Chamber. The federal administration would be small
relative to its powers: the EFS governs five domains with large budgets,
defence above all, but most of its spending flows through federal forces and
federal funds rather than through a central bureaucracy, and most of its taxes
are collected by national administrations on its behalf, as Chapter 6 sets out.
The European Parliament would continue as the Parliament of the Union; its
members elected in the participating states would sit as the provisional
Federal Chamber until the first federal elections, so that the EFS has a
legislature from its first day.
Reconciling the French and German traditions
The French and German constitutional traditions differ, and
a federation founded principally by the two states must reconcile them. The EFS
adopts a principle of pragmatic synthesis. Its legal system builds on the
continental civil law tradition that France and Germany share, so that the
common ground is large. The federal constitution draws on the consensus-seeking
and federal spirit of the German Basic Law, with its chamber of states, its
constructive vote of no confidence, its strong constitutional court and its
explicit protection of human dignity in Article 1. The federal codes of
commercial law draw on the clarity and systematic structure of the French
codes. The aim is not to choose between traditions but to build a working
system from both, and the recognition of French and German as working languages
of the federal courts and legislature ensures that both legal cultures are
present in the EFS's reasoning.
Two lessons and a warning from American federalism
The EFS can learn two crucial lessons from the history of
American federalism. The first is the necessity of an effective executive. The
United States succeeded where its predecessor, the Articles of Confederation of
1781, failed because the Constitution of 1787 created a government with a
national mandate able to tax and to raise an army. Under the Articles, the
central government depended on the voluntary contributions of the states, could
not regulate commerce and could not compel compliance, exactly the weaknesses
of the present Union in its confederal domains. The EFS learns this lesson
through a strong parliamentary executive, a Chancellor who commands a
legislative majority and can act, rather than through a directly elected
president, for the reasons given above. The second is the power of the
Supremacy Clause. Article VI of the American Constitution established that
federal law is the supreme law of the land, giving the federal government the
legal instrument to override conflicting state laws within its powers and
ensuring that the Union could function. The EFCT contains an equally clear
Supremacy Clause, bounded by the enumeration of federal competences.
America also offers a warning. The American Union held
together in 1861 only through a civil war, because its constitution was silent
on whether a state could leave. The EFS must not repeat that silence, and
Chapter 7 gives its answer.
Chapter 3
Defence, Diplomacy, the Frontier and Intelligence
From money to force: the Unified Federal Command Structure
The Union's regulatory power, the Brussels Effect by which
its rules on data, chemicals, competition and products become global norms
(Bradford 2020), ends where military force begins. Report I traced the
consequence in the defence and foreign-policy mismatches: the member states
spent 418 billion euros on defence in 2025, yet buy, maintain and command
twenty-seven separate forces, and any single government can halt the Union's
external action (Report I, Chapters 5 and 6). The design problem is therefore
not how to raise more money, since the Hague commitment of June 2025 already
binds the allies to five percent of GDP for defence and security by 2035, of
which 3.5 percent is for core defence (NATO 2025), but how to turn the money
already committed into a single deployable force under a single political
decision. The European Parliament's research service estimated in 2024 that the
lack of cooperation in defence costs between 18 and 57 billion euros a year
(European Parliamentary Research Service 2024). The answer of the EFS is the
Unified Federal Command Structure (UFCS): a single command able to act on a
single political decision, and a single procurement authority buying for the
whole federal force (Howorth 2019).
The UFCS is headed by a Chief of the Federal Defence Staff,
a serving officer appointed by the federal government for a term of four years
and responsible to the Federal Defence Minister, who is in turn responsible to
the Federal Chamber. Beneath the Chief of Staff stand a Joint Operations
Command, which plans and conducts operations, and four component commands for
land, air, maritime, and cyber and space forces, together with a Federal
Logistics and Support Command. The headquarters of the component commands are
distributed across the EFS, as Chapter 4 sets out for federal institutions
generally: the maritime command on the Mediterranean or the Atlantic, the land
command in central Europe, the air command in the north, the cyber and space
command in a state with the relevant industrial base. The Joint Operations
Command is co-located with the federal defence ministry.
The UFCS is formed by transferring to federal command, in
tranches, the operational units, headquarters and procurement agencies of the
participating states. The first tranche, in the first two years after the EFCT
enters into force, transfers the strategic enablers that no single state can
afford and that make Europe dependent on the United States: strategic airlift
and air-to-air refuelling, satellite reconnaissance and communications,
integrated air and missile defence, long-range precision strike and the stocks
of munitions needed for high-intensity warfare. The first tranche also
transfers the forces stationed on the eastern frontier and the multinational
formations that already exist, the Eurocorps in Strasbourg and the
German-Netherlands Corps, in which units of two national armies have served
under one command since 1995, so that the federal force is present from the
first year where deterrence matters most. The second tranche, in years three to
five, transfers the air forces and navies, whose equipment is most standardised
and whose operations are already conducted in NATO's common procedures and
common language. The third tranche, from year five, transfers the remaining
land forces. Each state retains under its own authority a territorial defence and
reserve component, whose size and form it decides, for civil protection, home
defence and the support of civil authorities, and the ceremonial units that
express national tradition.
The design responds to the specific question of how a
federal army can work across many languages. The answer is organisation along
linguistic lines at the level where soldiers must communicate under stress, and
a common working language at the level of command. Ground troops and tactical
units are organised in linguistic divisions, French-speaking, German-speaking,
Polish-speaking, Italian-speaking, Spanish-speaking and others, which preserve
the national and regional identities that give units their cohesion and their
traditions. Corps headquarters, the component commands, the joint command and
the federal defence ministry work in English, as NATO's integrated commands
already do. Linguistic divisions are an organisational choice rather than a
proven model, and they bring their own constraints: logistics, communications
and joint operations across divisions must work in the common language, and
officers and specialists must move between divisions, so that language training
is a core part of federal military education. The federal force recruits across
all participating states; a state that maintains military service under its own
law may offer its conscripts the choice of serving in the federal force, and
the federal force pays and pensions its personnel under a single federal
scheme.
Federal command is exercised by the Federal Defence
Minister. The defence of federal territory against armed attack is a standing
authorisation written into the EFCT, under the emergency procedure described
below. Any deployment outside the territory of the EFS requires the prior
approval of the Federal Chamber by an absolute majority, on a motion of the
federal government stating the mandate, the size of the force and the duration,
which the Chamber must renew annually. This rule follows the German parliamentary
reservation and is what makes a federal army acceptable to electorates that
fear its misuse: the force that defends them cannot be sent abroad by a
government alone.
Procurement is the second function of the UFCS. A Federal
Armaments Agency, built from the staff of the European Defence Agency, the
Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation and the national procurement
offices that transfer to it, buys for the whole federal force. Its first task
is to stop the proliferation of types: the 178 major weapon systems that
European armies operated in 2015, including seventeen types of main battle tank
against one in the United States, would be consolidated into a single federal
inventory by buying no new type that duplicates an existing one and by retiring
minority types as they reach the end of their service lives (European Political
Strategy Centre 2015). Its second task is to give the European defence industry
what it has never had, a single buyer placing long and predictable orders, so
that firms can expand capacity, and to use that position to require
cross-border consolidation of suppliers as a condition of the largest
contracts. The share of a federal procurement authority's spending that would
stay within Europe is a design choice, not a law of nature; the Agency's
mandate would set a European preference qualified by the test of operational
need, so that the federal force buys American where only American equipment exists
and European wherever European equipment meets the requirement.
The EFS inside NATO
The formation of a unified federal military would change the
structure of the Atlantic alliance. The EFS would form the European pillar of
NATO, assuming primary responsibility for the conventional defence of Europe.
Over time, the separate memberships of its participating states could be
replaced by a single EFS membership, though this would require negotiation,
because the North Atlantic Treaty contains no provision for a federation formed
from existing members; in the near term, the participating states would remain
parties to the treaty in their own right, and any arrangement under which they
coordinate their positions on federal instructions would require the agreement
of the other allies, since the North Atlantic Council decides by consensus
among sovereign members. The federal force would be assigned to NATO's
integrated command for the collective defence of the alliance area, as national
forces are now, and the UFCS would be built to be interoperable with NATO
procedures from the start, which is one reason its working language is English.
... ...
The external frontier
Beyond war and diplomacy lies the external frontier, which
Report I showed to be common in its consequences and national in its defence
(Report I, Chapter 7). The Pact on Migration and Asylum, applicable from 12
June 2026, introduces common screening and border procedures and a mechanism of
mandatory but flexible solidarity, but its administration remains with the
member states (Moutselos 2024).
The EFS would federalise the management of the external
frontier, treating it as a single border. National border agencies at the
external frontier would be replaced by a European Federal Border and Coast
Guard, built on Frontex, whose standing corps of 10,000 officers is its
nucleus, and on the national external-border services that transfer to it,
funded and commanded by the federal government through a Federal Minister for
the Frontier. Its officers would exercise the powers of border control on the
territory of every participating state under federal law, which is the step
Frontex cannot take, since its officers act under the command of the host state
(Campesi 2018). Internal border checks among the participating states would be
abolished in federal law as a consequence, and could be reintroduced only by a
decision of the federal government for a limited period. The federal border
service would be accountable in ways Frontex has not always been: its officers
would be subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, an independent
fundamental rights officer with powers of investigation would report to the
Federal Chamber, and any person affected by its operations could bring a
complaint before a federal tribunal (Marin 2024).
The frontier must also hold under pressure. In late July 2026 more than 1,500 people, most of them Moroccan nationals and a smaller number of Algerians, reached Ceuta by sea within a few days, and the enclave’s reception centre was overwhelmed (Brito 2026). Such an event tests capacities that no single city or state can supply, and the federal border service would hold them. It would keep a rapid-reaction reserve, deployable to any sector of the external frontier within forty-eight hours, so that a surge at one point is met by the resources of the whole federation rather than by the police of one city. It would apply the border procedure at the point of arrival, in reception facilities at the frontier, so that applicants from countries whose nationals are rarely granted protection receive an accelerated decision there and those refused are returned without entering the interior; the procedure may last at most twelve weeks from registration, after which the applicant must in principle be admitted to the territory, so that the federal agency would have to be staffed to decide within that period (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2024a). Where a third country or a hostile non-state actor deliberately encourages or facilitates such movements with the aim of destabilising the Union or a member state, and the movements are liable to put essential state functions at risk, the participating state concerned, acting with the federal government, may request authorisation to apply the temporary measures provided for in the Union’s regulation on crisis and force majeure, subject to the assessment, authorisation procedures and safeguards that it lays down (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2024b). Separately, the federal foreign ministry could suspend federal development assistance or visa facilitation to a third state whose conduct warrants it. These measures strengthen the frontier without closing it to those whom the law requires it to protect.
All asylum claims would be processed by a Federal Asylum
Agency, in centres at the external frontier, in Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta,
Croatia and on the eastern land border, funded and managed from the federal
budget, so that the financial and administrative burden no longer falls on the
states of arrival. The Agency would apply a single federal asylum law, built on
the procedures introduced by the Pact (Apatzidou 2025), with a first-instance
decision within a fixed period and an appeal to a federal asylum tribunal. Applicants
granted protection would be distributed among the participating states
according to a mandatory formula, weighted 40 percent by population and 60
percent by GDP in the preceding financial year, so that the richer states carry
a larger share and the poorer a smaller one, and no state’s share depends on
where the applicant happened to land. The formula carries a correction for the
number already received: a state whose cumulative intake over the preceding ten
years exceeds its share under the formula, as Sweden’s would after the arrivals
of 2015 and 2016, receives no new allocation until its cumulative share has
returned to the formula level.
The federal foreign ministry would negotiate and enforce
return agreements with countries of origin and transit, giving the EFS the
leverage in trade, visa and development policy that individual states lack, and
the Agency would operate a single return service for rejected applicants and
those without a right to remain. Admission for work, residence and
naturalisation would remain national decisions, because they belong to the
labour market and the social contract of each state, but the federal frontier
would give those decisions a frontier that holds.
The cost of the system is bounded. The budget of the Federal
Asylum Agency would be capped by the federal budget law at a fixed share of the
preceding year’s federal revenue and published each year. When spending
approaches the cap, the discretionary routes of entry, resettlement programmes,
humanitarian visas and family reunification beyond the minimum that law
requires, are suspended automatically and accelerated procedures are applied,
while every claim to protection that law requires to be heard continues to be
heard. Return is measured against a published annual target; if the rate falls
below it for two consecutive years, the federal foreign ministry must apply visa
restrictions and the suspension of federal development assistance to countries
of origin that refuse to readmit their nationals. Reception conditions during
the procedure are uniform across the EFS and paid by the federation, so that no
state can be chosen for its benefits; once protection is granted, access to
welfare is governed by the law of the receiving state alone, which may tie it
to employment, language learning and years of residence, and the EFS creates no
federal welfare entitlement of any kind. This design satisfies both north and
south: the south gains federal responsibility for the frontier, and the north
gains a frontier that is controlled.
Credits:
Conceptualised and Directed by: Juliet Zhong
2026 Edition Written with: Claude Opus 5.5 and Fable 5.1
Fact-checking and References: ChatGPT
First Edition (2025) Generated with: Gemini Flash
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